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The rule of law bears a special meaning in the context of the international legal order, where there is no clear vertical hierarchy or sovereign. The international rule of law strives to curb the excess autonomy of individual states for the common good. Although there is considerable scepticism about whether the international rule of law actually exists, states largely do behave as if international law is truly “law”, and international obligations are also more enforceable now than ever before. But there have been and will be moments when the international rule of law is interrupted by major powers. In an interdependent world that is both capable of and prone to inflicting unimaginable destruction, the strategy for small states unable to defend themselves directly is to create the conditions that will best promote their survival, and that is accomplished by pursuing and promoting the rule of law both domestically and internationally.

If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. AbstractPurpose -The purpose of this paper is to identify the key challenges in tackling modern economic and cyber crimes, evaluate the existing legal and enforcement mechanisms in place, and propose a way forward to address these challenges. Design/methodology/approach -The paper analyses the main difficulties posed by the borderless, complex and rapidly evolving nature of modern economic and cyber crimes. This allows the key shortcomings of the present legal and enforcement infrastructure to be identified. By examining different models, ranging from vertical supranational structures such as the International Criminal Court and the proposed European Public Prosecutor, to soft-law regimes such as the intergovernmental network the Financial Action Task Force, as well as intermediate approaches like Eurojust, a hybrid model incorporating elements from these various regimes is proposed. Findings -A transnational approach must be adopted to address the phenomenon of modern economic and cyber crimes which are cross-border, complex, profit-driven and rapidly evolving. A suitable multilateral platform needs to be created to facilitate international co-operation in a more coordinated and sustained fashion, and for the development of a set of common standards and principles to be enforced through a process of mutual assessments and periodic peer review. Originality/value -The paper advocates the establishment of a hybrid multilateral regime which incorporates both elements of a "vertical" supranational structure as well as a "horizontal" state-centric framework. This will inject the institutional focus to facilitate international co-operation and also provide the platform for the promulgation of common standards and principles in fighting cross-border economic and cyber crimes. The paper will be of interest to law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial authorities and national policy makers.

The legitimacy of a system of dispute resolution depends intrinsically on the trust and confidence of its users in its decision-making processes, and that in turn rests on the general adherence of those processes to the values and principles that constitute the rule of law. While international arbitration has long been a close partner of the courts in sustaining the rule of law, some of arbitration’s key features and practices – such as its consent-based limitations, its predisposition toward confidentiality, its longstanding practice of permitting parties to unilaterally appoint arbitrators, and its philosophy that parties have no right to a right answer – mean that arbitration supports an attenuated model of the rule of law. That is largely the result of conscious decisions to forgo certain rule of law values in order to realize other goals. But the problem of rising costs and delays, underpinned by arbitration’s growing procedural rigidity and lack of agility, exacts a heavy price on arbitration’s users and their confidence in arbitration, without obvious returns. We must be cognizant of arbitration’s sacrifice in terms of rule of law values when seeking to advance other objectives, and regularly reflect on whether those gains are still worth their cost. International arbitration, Rule of law, Consent, Arbitrability, Confidentiality, Multiparty disputes, Party appointment of arbitrators, Accessibility, Costs, Delays

The disturbing revelations arising out of the Croatia-Slovenia arbitration have underscored the importance of having a clear understanding of the role of the party-appointed arbitrator. The problem can be traced at least in part to the tension between the arbitrator’s personal incentives and professional obligations. On the one hand, the party-appointed arbitrator owes his appointment to the favour of his appointer. How the appointer assesses his performance will likely have a bearing on the appointee’s prospects of future appointments. But any such assessment will be from the subjective perspective of the appointer and will almost inevitably be tied to the outcome of the matter. This can create an economic incentive for the appointee to be sympathetic to the appointer’s case. On the other hand, most members of the arbitration community still hold to the view that there subsists a professional obligation of impartiality which inheres in the office of arbitrator and which is not to be diminished at all in the case of a party-appointed arbitrator. This requires not only that he act fairly, but also that he be seen to be doing so. This article examines the functions, duties and obligations of the party-appointed arbitrator from preappointment consultations to the final discharge of the mandate, and suggests some practical rules of engagement and best practices that emerge from the analysis. It also proposes a systematic approach to arbitrator regulation in the establishment of a central body to oversee the discipline of international arbitrators.