This article analyzes the influence of four sets of factors on deficit spending in 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies during 1958-1990. This article analyzes the influence of these factors and introduces and tests the importance of an additional potential influence on the size of a country's fiscal deficit: the “strength of fiscal bureaucracy.” It is argued that the stronger a country's fiscal bureaucracy, the lower its deficit, ceteris paribus. Empirically, the authors find that the state of a nation's economy heavily affects its deficit. Little systematic relationship is found between the ideology of the ruling political party and a nation's deficit or between the political strength of the ruling party and deficits, in contrast to the findings of Roubini and Sachs. Finally, it is found that the strength of a country's fiscal bureaucracy is an important influence on the deficit in these 9 industrialized parliamentary democracies.

Although job satisfaction is a primary human resource management concern, there is little empirical research considering job satisfaction in non-Western countries. In Korea, reforms aim to make the public service more competitive and diverse and have led to the recruitment of more women and young people. This study uses data from the Korean Income and Labor Panel Study to explore the relationship of age, gender, and service sector with job satisfaction. No substantial difference was found in the perceived job satisfaction of public employees of different ages, but an unexpected negative association was found in a subsample of private employees. Korean public and nonprofit employees are more satisfied with their jobs than private employees are but are less satisfied with their wages than with job security and job content. The study supports the expectation hypothesis and suggests there is a gender effect on job satisfaction, particularly for wages and work environment.

Responding to the lack of empirical research on the effect of collective intelligence on open innovation in the fourth industrial revolution, we examined the relationship between collective intelligence and open innovation. Collective intelligence or crowd innovation not only produces creative ideas or inventions, but also moderates any firm to innovate inside-out, outside-in, or in a coupled manner. We asked the following research questions: Does collective intelligence (or crowd innovation) motivate open innovation? Is there any difference in the effect of collective intelligence on open innovation by industry? These research questions led to the following three hypotheses: (1) Collective intelligence increases the performance of a firm, (2) collective intelligence will moderate the effect of open innovation, and (3) differences exist between the automotive industry and the pharmaceutical industry in these two effects. To empirically examine these three hypotheses, we analyzed the registered patents of these two industries from 2000 to 2014 over a 15-year period. These automotive and pharmaceutical patents were registered in the B60 category and the A61K category of the Korea Patent office, respectively. Collective intelligence was measured by co-invention. We found differences in the effects of collective intelligence on open innovation between the two industries. In the automotive industry, collective intelligence not only directly increased the performance, but also indirectly moderated the open innovation effect. However, this was not the case for the pharmaceutical industry.

The significance and the role of leadership in organizations and institutions have been widely discussed but not well understood. Much of the previous literature is limited to leadership practices and education as well as to the American context. Focusing on the Korean ministerial level, this study examines the ministerial leadership interplaying uniquely between the president (politics) and career civil servants (administration). Extending the typology of transformational and transactional leadership, this study presents five different leadership orientations and investigates their association with ministers' performances. Based on the 2002 Korean Minister Survey, this study shows that the strategic-transformational and external-transformational forms of leadership are the primary determinants of Korean ministers' performance. This study suggests that political appointees like Korean ministers should strike a balance between their political responsiveness as political appointees and their administrative responsibility as department heads.

The entry and exit of ministers has been of primary interest to students of political science and public management in Western countries. Responding to the lack of research on the entry and exit of ministers in non‐Western countries, this article examined determinants of both the entrance and exit of ministers in Korea from the life cycle point of view based on the Korean Ministerial Database from 1980 to 2008. We argued that as the Korean presidency shifts from an imperialistic to a democratic presidency, ministerial appointments in Korea also seem to shift from an expertise‐focused to a politics‐focused approach. Likewise, the primary resignation reason also shifts from policy failure to political reasons. We also argued that Korean presidents use their power to reshuffle cabinet ministers too often for their political interests. As a result, Korean ministers spend too little time in post; average tenure is now down to about one year. These short terms in office dilute a minister's ability to dictate departmental policy.