Exploring the Determinants of the Entry and Exit of Ministers inKorea: 1980–2008

Abstract

The entry and exit of ministers has been of primary interest to students of political science and public management in Western countries. Responding to the lack of research on the entry and exit of ministers in non‐Western countries, this article examined determinants of both the entrance and exit of ministers in Korea from the life cycle point of view based on the Korean Ministerial Database from 1980 to 2008. We argued that as the Korean presidency shifts from an imperialistic to a democratic presidency, ministerial appointments in Korea also seem to shift from an expertise‐focused to a politics‐focused approach. Likewise, the primary resignation reason also shifts from policy failure to political reasons. We also argued that Korean presidents use their power to reshuffle cabinet ministers too often for their political interests. As a result, Korean ministers spend too little time in post; average tenure is now down to about one year. These short terms in office dilute a minister's ability to dictate departmental policy.

Administrative reorganization as a signal: Bounded rationality, agency merger, and salience of policy issues

“…Indeed, the impacts of administrative reorganization may be moderated by various factors including political institutions (Chan & Lam, ). Particularly, the significant effects we found may be attributable to the overly strong authority given to the president of Korea (Hahm, Jung, & Lee, ; Lee, ; but also see Baum, ; Hong, ). Further, this study's findings do not suggest that administrative reorganization is necessarily followed by a change in the salience of policy issues; there may be cases of structural reorganizations pursued to achieve different goals.…”

Ministerial Leadership and Endorsement of Bureaucrats: Experimental Evidence from Presidential Governments

“…For all three endorsement questions, civil servant respondents were asked to evaluate their level of support for each skill on a 5‐point scale (from 5 to 1): “I strongly agree with this role”; “I somewhat agree with this role”; “I am indifferent to this role”; “I disagree with this role”; and “I strongly disagree with this role.” Respondents were also allowed to choose “Don't Know” or to refuse to answer. Given that the two most common and contrasting types of ministers are civil servants and legislators in the South Korean context (Hahm, Jung, and Lee ; Lee , ), the actual questions should be realistic so that respondents take them seriously.…”

Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government

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