Many complex systems can be described by networks, in which the constituent components are represented by vertices and the connections between the components are represented by edges between the corresponding vertices. A fundamental issue concerning complex networked systems is the robustness of the overall system to the failure of its constituent parts. Since the degree to which a networked system continues to function, as its component parts are degraded, typically depends on the integrity of the underlying network, the question of system robustness can be addressed by analyzing how the network structure changes as vertices are removed. Previous work has considered how the structure of complex networks change as vertices are removed uniformly at random, in decreasing order of their degree, or in decreasing order of their betweenness centrality. Here we extend these studies by investigating the effect on network structure of targeting vertices for removal based on a wider range of non-local measures of potential importance than simply degree or betweenness. We consider the effect of such targeted vertex removal on model networks with different degree distributions, clustering coefficients and assortativity coefficients, and for a variety of empirical networks.

Network analysis has proved to be a valuable tool for studying the behavioural patterns of complex social animals. Often such studies either do not distinguish between different behavioural states of the organisms or simply focus attention on a single behavioural state to the exclusion of all others. In either of these approaches it is impossible to ascertain how the behavioural patterns of individuals depend on the type of activity they are engaged in. Here we report on a network-based analysis of the behavioural associations in a population of bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) in Cedar Key, Florida. We consider three distinct behavioural states—socializing, travelling and foraging—and analyse the association networks corresponding to each activity. Moreover, in constructing the different activity networks we do not simply record a spatial association between two individuals as being either present or absent, but rather quantify the degree of any association, thus allowing us to construct weighted networks describing each activity. The results of these weighted activity networks indicate that networks can reveal detailed patterns of bottlenose dolphins at the population level; dolphins socialize in large groups with preferential associations; travel in small groups with preferential associates; and spread out to forage in very small, weakly connected groups. There is some overlap in the socialize and travel networks but little overlap between the forage and other networks. This indicates that the social bonds maintained in other activities are less important as they forage on dispersed, solitary prey. The overall network, not sorted by activity, does not accurately represent any of these patterns.

Cooperation in social dilemmas is essential for the functioning of systems at multiple levels of complexity, from the simplest biological organisms to the most sophisticated human societies. Cooperation, although widespread, is fundamentally challenging to explain evolutionarily, since natural selection typically favors selfish behavior which is not socially optimal. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in three exemplars of key social dilemmas, representing the prisoner’s dilemma, hawk-dove and coordination classes of games, in structured populations defined by complex networks. Using individual-based simulations of the games on model and empirical networks, we give a detailed comparative study of the effects of the structural properties of a network, such as its average degree, variance in degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and assortativity coefficient, on the promotion of cooperative behavior in all three classes of games.

The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

The traveler's dilemma game and the minimum-effort coordination game are social dilemmas that have received significant attention resulting from the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are inconsistent with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, both the traveler's dilemma and the minimum-effort coordination games have potentially important applications in evolutionary biology. Interestingly, standard deterministic evolutionary game theory, as represented by the replicator dynamics in a well-mixed population, is also inadequate to account for the behavior observed in these games. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of both these games in populations with interaction patterns described by a variety of complex network topologies. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of these games through agent-based simulations on both model and empirical networks. In particular, we study the effects of network clustering and assortativity on the evolutionary dynamics of both games. In general, we show that the evolutionary behavior of the traveler's dilemma and minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks is in good agreement with that observed experimentally. Thus, formulating the traveler's dilemma and the minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks neatly resolves the paradoxical aspects of these games.