An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093988

Cited by 18 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…We remind ourselves that evolutionary game dynamics have been successfully used to model real life problems in diverse fields, like, biology, economics, sociology, behavioural science, etc. Replicator dynamics is used as a model in problems involving social dilemma [36], molecular and cell biology [37], economy [38]. The field of grammar learning has been studied using replicator mutator as a dynamical model [39,40].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Periodic orbit can be evolutionarily stable: Case Study of discrete replicator dynamics

Mukhopadhyay

Chakraborty

2020

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or chaotic solution is many a time perceived as a shortcoming of the corresponding game dynamic because (Nash) equilibrium play is supposed to be robust and persistent behaviour, and any other behaviour in nature is deemed transient. Consequently, there is a lack of attempt to connect the non-fixed point solutions with the game theoretic concepts. Here we provide a way to render game theoretic meaning to periodic solutions. To this end, we consider a replicator map that models Darwinian selection mechanism in unstructured infinite-sized population whose individuals reproduce asexually forming non-overlapping generations. This is one of the simplest evolutionary game dynamic that exhibits periodic solutions giving way to chaotic solutions (as parameters related to reproductive fitness change) and also obeys the folk theorems connecting fixed point solutions with Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, we find that a modified Darwinian fitness-termed heterogeneity payoff-in the corresponding population game must be put forward as (conventional) fitness times the probability that two arbitrarily chosen individuals of the population adopt two different strategies. The evolutionary dynamics proceeds as if the individuals optimize the heterogeneity payoff to reach an evolutionarily stable orbit, should it exist. We rigorously prove that a locally asymptotically stable period orbit must be heterogeneity stable orbit-a generalization of evolutionarily stable state.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Periodic orbit can be evolutionarily stable: Case Study of discrete replicator dynamics

Mukhopadhyay

Chakraborty

2020

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…In this section, we define a stochastic individual-based model which allows the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric 2 × 2 games to be studied for populations with complex interaction patterns among their members [ 19 , 46 , 48 , 49 ]. Consider a population of n individuals, labeled by i = 1, …, n .…”

Section: Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In spite of the ubiquity of cooperation in social dilemmas, achieving a satisfactory understanding of the origin and stability of this phenomenon is fundamentally difficult [ 2 , 13 – 18 ]. This difficulty resides in the very nature of a social dilemma, which in classical game theory may be defined as a game which possesses at least one socially inefficient Nash equilibrium [ 16 , 19 ]. At this Nash equilibrium there is no incentive for any individual to change their behavior, and yet because it is socially inefficient there is at least one other outcome in which all individuals would be better of.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent work has also focussed on other interesting aspects of the evolution of cooperation in structured populations, including: the use of effective payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game [ 77 ]; the effect of random and targeted removal of vertices [ 78 ]; cooperation in populations with multiple interaction layers [ 79 ]; the effect of social influence [ 80 ]; the consequences of dynamical linking [ 81 , 82 ]; and the evolution of cooperation in other games, such as the traveler’s dilemma game and the minimum effort coordination game [ 19 , 83 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks

Iyer

Killingback

2016

PLoS Comput Biol

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Cooperation in social dilemmas is essential for the functioning of systems at multiple levels of complexity, from the simplest biological organisms to the most sophisticated human societies. Cooperation, although widespread, is fundamentally challenging to explain evolutionarily, since natural selection typically favors selfish behavior which is not socially optimal. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in three exemplars of key social dilemmas, representing the prisoner’s dilemma, hawk-dove and coordination classes of games, in structured populations defined by complex networks. Using individual-based simulations of the games on model and empirical networks, we give a detailed comparative study of the effects of the structural properties of a network, such as its average degree, variance in degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and assortativity coefficient, on the promotion of cooperative behavior in all three classes of games.

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“…For those macroeconomists who believe that an economy may become mired in a low-output equilibrium, the coordination game is a particularly important paradigm [6,7]. It is also worth noting that coordination game has a potentially important application to evolutionary biology [6,8,9]. In addition, the coordination model helps to explain the puzzle why cooperative behavior can emerge when only the fittest survive: for example, punishment, an important mechanism that restricts selfish behavior, in fact transforms social dilemmas (such as prisoner's dilemma game or public goods game) into coordination games [10][11][12][13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in minimum-effort coordination games

Cong

Wang

2016

Physics Letters A

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The minimum-effort coordination game draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the predictions of classical game theory. Here, we combine evolutionary game theory and coalescence theory to investigate this game in finite populations. Both analytic results and individual-based simulations show that effort costs play a key role in the evolution of contribution levels, which is in good agreement with those observed experimentally. Besides well-mixed populations, set structured populations have also been taken into consideration. Therein we find that large number of sets and moderate migration rate greatly promote effort levels, especially for high effort costs.

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An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

Cited by 18 publications

References 50 publications

Periodic orbit can be evolutionarily stable: Case Study of discrete replicator dynamics

Periodic orbit can be evolutionarily stable: Case Study of discrete replicator dynamics

Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in minimum-effort coordination games

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