Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractOur study is motivated by two disturbing evidences concerning women in India. On one hand, crime against women is on the rise while on the other, women's labor force participation rate (WLFPR) has been declining over the last three decades. We estimate the extent to which the decline in WLFPR can be assigned to increasing instances of crime against women. We argue that an increase in crime against women, increases the non-pecuniary costs of traveling to work, particularly in a traditional society marked by stigma against victims of sexual crimes. Our findings suggest that women are less likely to work away from home in regions where the perceived threat of sexual * We thank the seminar participants at IIT-Kanpur, ISI-Delhi, University of Goettingen

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Following the evolutionary game-theoretic approach to analyze Conjectural Variations (CV) in oligopolies, a model is developed to derive the Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) for quantity-setting and price-setting oligopolies with CV, producing heterogeneous goods. It is shown that ESS coincides with the Consistent CV in the oligopoly model. Earlier studies have demonstrated the above result only for duopolies. It is also shown that the market outcome induced by ESS is socially suboptimal if firms produce heterogeneous products, but can be socially optimal if firms produce homogeneous goods. In general, the market outcome approaches the socially optimal outcome, as the number of firms increases to infinity.

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