Using data from 62 U.S. industries for 1984-2000, this article explores the connections between shareholder value strategies, such as mergers and layoffs, and related industry-level changes, such as de-unionization, computer technology, and profitability. In line with shareholder value arguments, mergers occurred in industries with low profits, and industries where mergers were active subsequently saw an increase in layoffs. Industries with a high level of mergers increased investment in computer technology. This technology displaced workers through layoffs and was focused on reducing unionized workforces. Contrary to shareholder value arguments, there is no evidence that mergers or layoffs returned industries to profitability.

This study examines how firms use benchmarking information about peers to determine the compensation that they offer to chief executive officers (CEOs). It jointly addresses two distinct perspectives: pay equity and managerial power. Pay inequity provides strong motivation for CEOs to restore equity, by promoting the logic of external fairness and urging boards of directors to implement peer benchmarking and adjust the focal CEO’s compensation levels. Although pay inequity may motivate CEOs to restore equity, their reaction to inequity may be effective only when they have sufficient power over the board of directors to influence the pay-setting process. Results from a sample of 1,555 CEOs generally support predictions about the moderating effects of CEO power in the relationship between a focal CEO’s pay and peer CEOs’ pay. The compensation for underpaid CEOs with relatively greater power over the board is associated with their peers’ compensation, suggesting that peer benchmarking is more aggressively used to adjust CEO compensation upward. For overpaid CEOs, the relationship between the focal CEO’s pay and peer CEOs’ pay is weaker when the CEOs have greater influence over the board, suggesting that such CEOs are able to avoid the use of benchmarking and downward adjustments of pay.

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Once a preferred strategy, corporate diversification into disparate lines of business has gradually declined in the U.S. over the past several decades. We argue that changes that occurred in a closely related domain—graduate business education—are important in understanding variation in de-diversification across firms. Building on a historical account of the transformation of business education, we explain how the rise of financial economics and agency-theoretic logic in business education changed students’ views about diversification. Nearly 20 years later, these MBA graduates rose to top decision-making positions and put the brakes on diversification. Using data on CEOs who ran 640 large U.S. corporations from 1985 to 2015, we show that CEOs who earned an MBA before the 1970s actively pursued diversification, whereas the next cohort of CEOs, who had been exposed to agency-theoretic logic in financial economics, refrained from it. We also demonstrate that the degree of managerial discretion moderated the effect of the CEO’s MBA education. Our study shows that institutional change in one domain (i.e., business education) contributed to change in another domain (i.e., corporate diversification), albeit with a considerable time lag.

The language that signals conformity to a prevailing norm can contribute to the appearance of managerial competency and organizational legitimacy. We argue that top corporate managers’ use of language that is congruent with a prevailing norm leads the boards of directors to evaluate the managers more favourably and to grant a higher level of compensation. We test this argument by analysing the letters to shareholders from 334 US firms and examine the CEOs’ expression of the shareholder value principle, which is a prevailing model of corporate governance in the USA. We found that the use of shareholder‐value language is significantly related to a higher level of CEO compensation and that the effect of shareholder‐value language is greater when shareholder activism is stronger.