No abstract

Patents, Imitation, Innovation, Product cycles, Non-diversifiable risk, L11, L16, O31, O34,

A multi-economy Schumpeterian growth model is constructed. Economies are interdependent through technology transfer. Households can stay as workers or become researchers at some cost. Workers are employed in production and researchers in R&D. Workers are unionized and union power depends on the government's protection. The main findings are as follows. If international technological dependence increases, then workers' wages, the growth rate, and the level of welfare fall. The international coordination of labor union policy raises workers' wages and promotes growth and welfare.

This paper presents a growth model with two sectors. In the high-tech sector, R&D increases productivity and union-firm bargaining determines wages, but in the traditional sector there are neither R&D nor labour unions. The government is able to regulate union bargaining power. The main results are as follows. Because firms try to escape wage increases through the improvement of productivity by R&D, the increase in union bargaining power boosts R&D and growth. It is welfare enhancing to strengthen (weaken) unions when the growth rate is below (above) some critical level. A specific rule is presented for when deunionization is socially desirable.

This paper examines the relationship between growth and inflation in an open economy where private agents can transfer resources abroad. To obtain endogenous growth, we assume that the international credit market is imperfect. We show that when the governments behave rationally the growth and inflation rates should not be correlated, and that the optimal inflation rate can be found by setting the interest rate elasticity of money holdings equal to the tax rate elasticity of the tax base.