Teacher education is often viewed as too theoretical and not sufficiently concerned with the realities of classroom practice. From this perspective theory and practice are cast as distinct realms whose only connection comes when theory influences practice. We argue that the theory-practice dichotomy lacks the richness of Vygotsky's notion of concepts, in which abstract principles are interwoven with worldly experience. More specifically, Vygotsky distinguishes two types of concepts, spontaneous concepts and scientific concepts. Spontaneous concepts are learned through cultural practice and, because they are tied to learning in specific contexts, allow for limited generalization to new situations; scientific concepts are learned through formal instruction and, because they are grounded in general principles, can more readily be applied to new situations. Vygotsky argues that while spontaneous concepts may be developed without formal instruction, scientific concepts require interplay with spontaneous concepts; hence the problematic nature of the theory-practice dichotomy. He further identifies two types of generalization that approximate concepts yet do not achieve their theoretical unity: complexes, in which some members of the set may be unified with others but all are not unified according to the same principle; and pseudoconcepts, in which members of the set appear unified but include internal inconsistencies. We argue that teacher educators should strive to teach concepts, though the overall structure of teacher education programs makes it more likely that their students will learn complexes or pseudoconcepts. We illustrate these problems with examples from case studies of teachers making the transition from their teacher education programs to their first jobs. Many educators believe that teacher education programs are too theoretical, emphasizing ideals and abstractions at the expense of the mundane tools needed for effective practice (Baldassarre, 1997; Gallagher, 1996; Kallos, 1999; Voutira, 1996). This schism is revealed in the lament of a teacher who, when asked about the value of contemporary literary theory to her instruction, responded that theories are ''far removed from those of us who work the front lines!'' (Applebee, 1993, p. 122). Wilhelm

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Teacher education is often viewed as too theoretical and not sufficiently concerned with the realities of classroom practice. From this perspective theory and practice are cast as distinct realms whose only connection comes when theory influences practice. We argue that the theory-practice dichotomy lacks the richness of Vygotsky's notion of concepts, in which abstract principles are interwoven with worldly experience. More specifically, Vygotsky distinguishes two types of concepts, spontaneous concepts and scientific concepts. Spontaneous concepts are learned through cultural practice and, because they are tied to learning in specific contexts, allow for limited generalization to new situations; scientific concepts are learned through formal instruction and, because they are grounded in general principles, can more readily be applied to new situations. Vygotsky argues that while spontaneous concepts may be developed without formal instruction, scientific concepts require interplay with spontaneous concepts; hence the problematic nature of the theory-practice dichotomy. He further identifies two types of generalization that approximate concepts yet do not achieve their theoretical unity: complexes, in which some members of the set may be unified with others but all are not unified according to the same principle; and pseudoconcepts, in which members of the set appear unified but include internal inconsistencies. We argue that teacher educators should strive to teach concepts, though the overall structure of teacher education programs makes it more likely that their students will learn complexes or pseudoconcepts. We illustrate these problems with examples from case studies of teachers making the transition from their teacher education programs to their first jobs.

This article narrates the author's experience of obtaining institutional review board (IRB) approval for her dissertation study. Although her research topic was particularly sensitive, this case is illustrative of the increasing level of difficulty qualitative researchers are facing in conducting not only risky research but also work that is not aligned with the National Research Council's conception of "scientific" methodology. The author nests her story within the larger social context of surveillance and disciplinary power operating on today's educational researchers. She focuses her attention on the complex power relations among researchers, IRBs, and arbiters of what counts as quality research.A s a public high school teacher, I learned pretty quickly how to pay lip service to what was fast becoming the modus operandi of schools in the mid-to late-1990s, the tenure of my teaching: standardized test preparation and its attendant curricular requirements. As long as my students produced acceptable test scores and I fronted what Foucault (1975Foucault ( /1995 terms a docile body, seemingly in compliance with the norms of the school, what happened behind my closed classroom door was unquestioned. I never really felt the effects of disciplinary power until I openly and defiantly challenged the school's practices my last semester of teaching, when I knew I was graduate school bound and untouchable. That is not to say that disciplinary power wasn't operating on me prior to my resistance to it; as Foucault argues, disciplinary power works most effectively when it is invisible:In order to be exercised, this power had to be given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long Qualitative Inquiry