Exploiting the heterogeneity in legal constraints on local bank employees' mobility, I show that access to local information influences banks' modes of expansion. Banks entering a new market typically establish new branches directly when interbank labor mobility is less restrictive but acquire incumbent branches otherwise. The treatment effect is strengthened when information asymmetries between local and entrants are severe. Furthermore, I find a surge in the total amount of local small business and mortgage loans granted, a higher mortgage approval rate, and a reduction of mortgage rates by surrounding incumbent branches, precisely around the period of entrants establishing new branches, which indicate intensified competition among banks.

Exploiting the heterogeneity in legal constraints on local bank employees' mobility, I show that access to local information influences banks' modes of expansion. Banks entering a new market typically establish new branches directly when interbank labor mobility is less restrictive but acquire incumbent branches otherwise. The treatment effect is strengthened when information asymmetries between local and entrants are severe. Furthermore, I find a surge in the total amount of local small business and mortgage loans granted, a higher mortgage approval rate, and a reduction of mortgage rates by surrounding incumbent branches, precisely around the period of entrants establishing new branches, which indicate intensified competition among banks.

This paper studies the role of banks' branching networks in propagating the oil shocks. Banks that were exposed to the oil shocks through their operations in oil-concentrated counties experienced a liquidity drainage in the form of a declining amount of demand deposit inflow as well as an increasing percentage of troubled loans. Banks were forced to sell liquid assets, and contracted lending to small businesses and mortgage borrowers in counties that were not directly affected by the oil shocks. The effect is magnified when banks do not have strong community ties, but is mitigated if banks' branching network is sufficiently dispersed. I also find the decline in local credit supply cannot be completely offset by healthy competing banks' increased lending, providing fresh evidence from the perspective of bank competition.