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It has been suggested that political distrust is associated with lower levels of voter turnout and increased votes for challenger or populist parties. We investigate the relationship between political (dis)trust and electoral behaviour using the 2009 Belgian Election Study. Belgium presents an interesting case because compulsory voting (with an accompanying turnout rate of 90.4 per cent) compels distrusting voters to participate in elections. Nevertheless, distrusting voters are significantly more inclined to cast a blank or invalid vote. Second, distrust is positively associated with a preference for extreme right (Vlaams Belang) and populist (Lijst Dedecker) parties. Third, in party systems where there is no supply of viable challengers (i.e. the French‐speaking region of Belgium), the effect of political trust on party preference is limited. We conclude that electoral effects of political distrust are determined by the electoral and party system and the supply of electoral protest.

Neo‐liberal populist parties, like Forza Italia or Lijst Pim Fortuyn, aim to reverse the trend towards big government and state intervention while at the same time defending the ‘ordinary people’ against an allegedly ‘corrupt elite’. While it is possible to distinguish neo‐liberal populism from the populist radical right, it is less clear whether the causes of their electoral successes might be differentiated as well. This article attempts to explain the unexpected breakthrough of the neo‐liberal populist Lijst Dedecker (LDD), a new party which gained representation in the Belgian parliament in 2007. It is argued that LDD profited from an electoral opportunity structure – that is, an ideological gap between the mainstream parties, which had converged to the centre, and the Vlaams Belang on the radical right – and the populist appeal from its charismatic leader. Both the populist radical right and neo‐liberal populism seem to profit mainly from the same breeding ground.

Despite the proliferation of studies exploring the success of the populist radical right, there is a lack of research on why these parties decline or fail. And when this question is addressed, the literature focuses on supply-side variables such as leadership battles or a lack of organizational structure. These explanations largely fall short, however, in understanding the strange decline of the Belgian Vlaams Belang at the latest elections. Instead, it is argued that there is less space available for the populist radical right. Survey data suggests that two competing parties succeeded in exploiting issues that were previously owned exclusively by the Vlaams Belang (VB). More surprising, however, is the impact of the cordon sanitaire on the decline of the VB. This study shows that although populist radical right parties might not perform well in government, they will face difficulties too if they stay in permanent opposition, because they become perceived as irrelevant in the long run.