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Research from various countries demonstrates that trust builds social cohesion and confl icts may be solved as a result. Many alternatives for reconciliation in various countries have been studied and introduced to Th ailand. However, the implementation of a reconciliation policy in Th ailand seems to be impossible without having the atmosphere of peace building and specifi cally, trust building. Th is study aims to measure trust and discuss factors that may be problematic for establishing social cohesion, explaining why the process of reconciliation cannot be successful without trust building. Th e data from the Social Quality survey conducted by King Prajadhipok's Institute in late 2009 was used. Th is study fi nds that Th ai society is still fragile because of the decreasing trust among people as well as confi dence in various institutions, particularly political institutions.

This article presents the benefits of public participation concerning social and environmental impacts in the development of an infrastructure project. A small hydropower project, which is situated in the Nan Province, Thailand, is selected as a case study. In this study, the public participation process comprised an interview questionnaire survey and a focus group discussion; 1550 questionnaires were used to collect the opinion of local people and stakeholders regarding the project's development. Citizen dialogue and focus group discussions were conducted to provide information and to collect details of the public's opinions, concerns, and needs. The results from the questionnaires were analyzed statistically and then illustrated on maps using the Geographic Information System technique. The results from the citizens' dialogue and the focus group discussion show the benefit of giving project information to local people and bringing the needs of all groups into consideration in planning, decision‐making, and the implementation of the project. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Hopes for democracy in Thailand rest largely on impacts of the Constitution of 1997, influencing the electoral process. Although democracy has been developing steadily since 1978, the new constitution represents a step-level shift in the movement toward full democracy. Not only does the new constitution radically revise the systems of electoral democracy, it also creates new institutions for democratic governance that parallel elections as major instruments of democratic authority. Three institutions are of special relevance for understanding the new Thai political democracy. The first is the Constitutional Court, a body of 15 judges, appointed by the King, but expressly on the advice and selection by the Senate, which chooses from a list submitted by a special committee composed primarily of academics in law and political science. These judges are chosen, essentially in voting by the Supreme Court of Justice from among its members (5), two members of the Supreme Administrative Court, five qualified lawyers, and (mirabilis dictu) three political scientists. These persons are, by qualification, far removed from any association with politics or government and are responsible for interpreting the Constitution as issues arise. The second major institution of relevance is the Election Commission. A similar process is followed for selection by the Senate of a five-member commission charged with the responsibility to oversee election activities. Persons appointed to the commission cannot hold political office and cannot have held membership in a political party for the previous five years. 1 Organic laws implementing provisions of this institution provide for the national Election Commission to create regional and local election commissions to oversee elections in these areas. As it turns out, the powers of the Election Commission are not inconsequential. As a result of statutory authority giving the Commission power to certify elections to office, the Commission invalidates elections and either disqualifies a candidate or requires new elections when previous balloting is suspect. Assertion of this authority has led to microscopic examination of the integrity of

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