Visual stimuli may remain invisible but nevertheless produce strong and reliable effects on subsequent actions. How well features of a masked prime are perceived depends crucially on its physical parameters and those of the mask. We manipulated the visibility of masked stimuli and contrasted it with their influence on the speed of motor actions, comparing the temporal dynamics of visual awareness in metacontrast masking with that of action priming under the same conditions. We observed priming with identical time course for reportable and invisible prime stimuli, despite qualitative changes in the masking time course. Our findings indicate that experimental variations that modify the subjective visual experience of masked stimuli have no effect on motor effects of those stimuli in early processing. We propose a model that provides a quantitative account of priming effects on response speed and accuracy.

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Current theories of dual visual systems suggest that color is processed in a ventral cortical stream that eventually gives rise to visual awareness but is only indirectly involved in visuomotor control mediated by the dorsal stream. If the dorsal stream is indeed less sensitive to color than the ventral stream, color stimuli blocked from awareness by visual masking should also be blocked from guiding fast motor responses. In this study, pointing movements to one of two isoluminant color targets were preceded by consistent or inconsistent color primes. Trajectories were strongly affected by priming, with kinematics implying a continuous flow of color information into executive brain areas while the finger was already moving. Motor effects were more sensitive to color of the primes than were deliberate attempts to identify the primes in forced-choice tasks based on visual awareness. Priming was observed even when masking was complete.

Single-cell recordings have indicated that visual stimuli elicit rapid waves of neuronal activation that propagate so fast that they might be free of intracortical feedback. Here, the time course of feedforward activation was traced by measuring pointing responses to color targets preceded by color primes initiating either the same or opposite response. The early time course of priming effects was strictly time locked to prime onset and depended only on properties of the primes, but was independent of the onset times of the actual targets as well as the perceptual effects of targets on primes. Results indicated that nonoverlapping feedforward signals by primes and targets traverse the visuomotor system in a rapid chase, controlling associated motor responses in strict sequence.

Some studies of unconscious cognition rely on judgments of participants stating that they have “not seen” the critical stimulus (e.g., in a masked-priming experiment). Trials in which participants gave invisibility judgments are then treated as those where the critical stimulus was “subliminal” or “unconscious,” as opposed to trials with higher visibility ratings. Sometimes, only these trials are further analyzed, for instance, for unconscious priming effects. Here I argue that this practice requires implicit assumptions about subjective measures of awareness incompatible with basic models of categorization under uncertainty (e.g., modern signal-detection and threshold theories). Most importantly, it ignores the potential effects of response bias. Instead of taking invisibility judgments literally, they would better be employed in parametric experiments where stimulus visibility is manipulated systematically, not accidentally. This would allow studying qualitative and double dissociations between measures of awareness and of stimulus processing per se.