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L’objectif de notre article est d’étudier l'impact des quotas de genre sur la performance des entreprises. Nous considérons pour cela les lois imposant un quota de genre dans certains pays européens comme une expérience quasi naturelle. Notre analyse statistique montre que les caractéristiques des membres du conseil d’administration changent de manière significative après la mise en place de telles mesures. Les résultats de notre analyse empirique mettent en évidence que les quotas de genre réduisent le coût des fonds propres à court terme des entreprises, mais diminuent leur Tobin’s Q à long terme, tout en ayant un impact neutre sur leur rentabilité à court terme et à plus long terme. Notre analyse soutient également l'argument selon lequel les responsables politiques peuvent recourir à un dispositif de quotas pour favoriser la parité au sein des conseils d'administration sans générer d'effets négatifs sur la performance à court terme des entreprises. Cependant, un impact négatif sur leur Tobin’s Q peut être attendu à long terme. Notre analyse suggère finalement que l’influence des femmes dans les conseils d’administration sur la performance des entreprises suscite des attentes irréalistes de meilleure performance de la part des responsables politiques.

PurposeThe authors examine whether the uncertainty avoidance culture and the stringency of government response play a role in shaping the stock market's response to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The authors find that investors' response to the pandemic will not only depend on their instinct of uncertainty aversion but also on their expectation about the effectiveness of the government measures. The uncertainty avoidance culture amplifies the irrational actions of investors. However, harsh government responses will weaken this effect. Harsh government responses also send a negative signal to the market about the extent of the pandemic and the economic damage caused by anti-COVID measures. Governments need to be balanced in imposing anti-COVID measurements to preserve market confidence.Design/methodology/approachIn this article, the authors investigate whether the stock market volatility of emerging countries is simultaneously driven by two factors: the uncertainty-aversion culture of investors in a country and the stringency of the government's response to the pandemic. The authors conduct an empirical study on a sample of 20 emerging countries during the period from January 2020 to March 2021.FindingsThe authors find that the national-level uncertainty aversion amplifies the irrational actions of investors during the period of crisis. However, harsh government responses will weaken this effect. The authors’ findings show evidence that investors' response to the pandemic will not only depend on their instinct of uncertainty aversion but also on their expectation about the effectiveness of the government measures. Although harsh government responses can stabilize the investors' sentiment in countries with high levels of uncertainty aversion, they also send a negative signal to the market about the extent of the pandemic as well as the economic damage caused by anti-COVID measures.Originality/valueFirst, the study’s results complement evidence from existing studies on the effect of uncertainty avoidance culture in determining stock market responses to COVID-19. Second, an important difference from previous studies, this paper adds to the behavioral finance literature by showing that investors' investment decisions in the face of economic uncertainty are not driven solely by their cultural values but also by their expectation about the effectiveness of the government policy. During a crisis, when the market has neither rational information nor adequate experience to forecast the future, the government must play an important role in stabilizing investors' sentiment and reactions.

Using a panel of controlled European banks, we examine whether board structures that include directors that are related to minority shareholders can be an effective corporate governance mechanism to limit expropriation by controlling shareholders, without exacerbating risk. We find that the inclusion of such minority directors does indeed increase the effectiveness of bank boards, as it results in higher market valuations whereas the presence of independent directors does not, without increasing risk. Our results depend crucially on whether or not minority directors are related to "active" institutional investors, the extent of holdings of related shareholders, as well as the strength of the supervisory regime. To identify the relationship, we use as instrumental variable for the presence of minority directors the distance of minority shareholders from the headquarters of the bank.