of the Bank of Canada for useful comments. We would also like to thank Jeremy Graveline from the University of Minnesota and Mark Reesor from the University of Western Ontario for helpful discussions. All thanks are without implication and we retain any and all responsibility for any remaining omissions or errors.iii AbstractThe stochastic simulation model suggested by Bolder (2003) for the analysis of the federal government's debt-management strategy provides a wide variety of useful information. It does not, however, assist in determining an optimal debt-management strategy for the government in its current form. Including optimization in the debt-strategy model would be useful, since it could substantially broaden the range of policy questions that can be addressed. Finding such an optimal strategy is nonetheless complicated by two challenges. First, performing optimization with traditional techniques in a simulation setting is computationally intractable. Second, it is necessary to define precisely what one means by an "optimal" debt strategy. The authors detail a possible approach for addressing these two challenges. They address the first challenge by approximating the numerically computed objective function using a function-approximation technique. They consider the use of ordinary least squares, kernel regression, multivariate adaptive regression splines, and projection-pursuit regressions as approximation algorithms. The second challenge is addressed by proposing a wide range of possible government objective functions and examining them in the context of an illustrative example. The authors' view is that the approach permits debt and fiscal managers to address a number of policy questions that could not be fully addressed with the current stochastic simulation engine.

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This article explores normative arguments for mandatory judicial bilingualism. It disentangles the links between the normative reasons advanced for mandatory bilingualism and the correlative level of French that should be expected of judges. To provide empirical anchoring, we construct a bilingualism score of Canadian Supreme Court justices composed of four indicators. The score shows that non-systematic assessments used so far like self-assessments, parliamentary hearings and media coverage are not reliable instruments to predict the level of use of French on the Supreme Court. Also, the score suggests that institutional dynamics have an impact worth studying in more depth. Ultimately, the measurement of functional bilingualism depends first on which linguistic capacity is being measured. This, in turn, depends on the normative reasons supporting the requirement of functional bilingualism. Instead of asking whether French should be mandatory upon appointment, it might be more productive to ask how much French should be required.

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