No abstract

The origin of millet from Neolithic China has generally been accepted, but it remains unknown whether common millet (Panicum miliaceum) or foxtail millet (Setaria italica) was the first species domesticated. Nor do we know the timing of their domestication and their routes of dispersal. Here, we report the discovery of husk phytoliths and biomolecular components identifiable solely as common millet from newly excavated storage pits at the Neolithic Cishan site, China, dated to between ca. 10,300 and ca. 8,700 calibrated years before present (cal yr BP). After ca. 8,700 cal yr BP, the grain crops began to contain a small quantity of foxtail millet. Our research reveals that the common millet was the earliest dry farming crop in East Asia, which is probably attributed to its excellent resistance to drought.Holocene ͉ origins of agriculture ͉ phytoliths ͉ Neolithic ͉ Cishan F oxtail millet (Setaria italica) and common millet (or broomcorn millet; Panicum miliaceum) were among the world's most important and ancient domesticated crops. They were staple foods in the semiarid regions of East

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.

Opponents of mandatory rotation argue that a change of partner is bad for audit quality, as it results in a loss of client-specific knowledge. On the other hand, proponents argue that a change of partner is beneficial, as it results in a positive peer review effect and a fresh perspective on the audit. We test the impact of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality using a unique dataset of audit adjustments in China. Our results suggest that mandatory rotation of engagement partners results in higher quality audits in the years immediately surrounding rotation. Specifically, we find a significantly higher frequency of audit adjustments during the departing partner's final year of tenure prior to mandatory rotation and during the incoming partner's first year of tenure following mandatory rotation.

Investor protection is associated with greater investment sensitivity to q and lower investment sensitivity to cash flow. Finance plays a role in causing these effects; in countries with strong investor protection, external finance increases more strongly with q, and declines more strongly with cash flow. We further find that q and cash flow sensitivities are associated with ex post investment efficiency; investment predicts growth and profits more strongly in countries with greater q sensitivities and lower cash flow sensitivities. The paper's findings are broadly consistent with investor protection promoting accurate share prices, reducing financial constraints, and encouraging efficient investment.IN THIS PAPER, WE study how investor protection affects firm-level resource allocations. Our analyses center on two hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is that stock prices more strongly predict both investment and external finance in countries with stronger investor protection laws. Tobin (1969) shows in a frictionless setting that marginal q predicts real investment. In this framework high marginal q firms should, all else equal, also raise the most capital as these firms invest more. We use average q (q) as a proxy for marginal q, and test whether investment and external finance are more sensitive to q in countries with stronger investor protection laws.We base our first hypothesis on three assumptions. First, we assume that investor protection laws encourage more accurate financial reporting (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003)) and more arbitrage (Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000)), both of which should result in stock prices that more accurately reflect fundamental values. Second, we assume that investor protections improve firms' access to external finance for value-enhancing projects (La Porta et al.