The history of 20th-century American psychology is often depicted as a history of the rise and fall of behaviorism. Although historians disagree about the theoretical and social factors that have contributed to the development of experimental psychology, there is widespread consensus about the growing and (later) declining influence of behaviorism between approximately 1920 and 1970. Because such wide-scope claims about the development of American psychology are typically based on small and unrepresentative samples of historical data, however, the question arises to what extent the received view is justified. This article aims to answer this question in two ways. First, we use advanced scientometric tools (e.g., bibliometric mapping, cocitation analysis, and term co-occurrence analysis) to quantitatively analyze the metadata of 119,278 articles published in American journals between 1920 and 1970. We reconstruct the development and structure of American psychology using cocitation and co-occurrence networks and argue that the standard story needs reappraising. Second, we argue that the question whether behaviorism was the “dominant” school of American psychology is historically misleading to begin with. Using the results of our bibliometric analyses, we argue that questions about the development of American psychology deserve more fine-grained answers.

Inge van de Ven & Ties van GemertTo cite this article: Inge van de Ven & Ties van Gemert (2020): Filter bubbles and guru effects: Jordan B. Peterson as a public intellectual in the attention economy, Celebrity Studies,

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This essay will engage in a critical dialogue with Massumi’s concept of speculative pragmatism by reconstructing and interrogating the epistemology and metaphysics it presupposes. First, we will narrate and explicate the metaphysics embedded in the philosophy of speculative pragmatism. Secondly, we will recapitulate Massumi’s conceptualization of speculative pragmatism in his book Semblance and Event (2011). Our reading of this book will lead us to argue that speculative pragmatism can be reformulated as a philosophy of panperceptionism. The essay will end with some remarks and questions that aim to challenge the epistemology and metaphysics of speculative pragmatism. We will focus on Massumi’s synthesizing of the subject-object distinction, his theory of judgement, and his deflationary notion of truth.   Article received: April 16, 2020; Article accepted: July 1, 2020; Published online: April 15, 2021; Original scholarly paper