No abstract

The institutional framework of entitlements set forth by the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has played an unintended but significant role in hampering species recovery efforts. Whereas the ESA explicitly designates the rights and duties of individuals and government agencies with regard to the protection of listed species, it leaves the implementation of recovery efforts largely to the discretion of the landowner. Such a designation of rights creates numerous perverse incentives that hinder the implementation of recovery efforts. Flexible incentive programs could be used to address this gap in endangered species conservation by rewarding the implementation of recovery efforts of private landowners. Research into the human dimensions of species recovery would allow the formulation of policies and incentives designed to reduce the barriers to species recovery and take advantage of the positive attitudes much of the public has of the intrinsic value of species.

Although the Endangered Species Act (ESA) explicitly designates the rights of individuals with regard to the protection of listed species, recovery efforts are left largely to the landowner's discretion. Numerous obstacles or barriers to private landowner participation in species recovery exist. Incentives, both monetary and nonmonetary, provide a means of removing, reducing, or offsetting the obstacles inhibiting private landowners from voluntarily moving from species protection to species recovery. Incentives can be used to motivate landowners who question the distributional equity of the situation or cannot afford recovery efforts on their own. They can also address issues of procedural justice, information needs, and trust. Incentive programs must be flexible, in order to effectively address the mix of impediments faced by different landowners. Incentives can foster an environment in which landowners and wildlife agencies can collaborate in species recovery efforts.