No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

Based on a case study of food safety governance, this article examines how rule-makers can employ additional intermediaries to address agency problems between the rule-makers and the initial intermediaries upon whom they rely to govern targets of regulation. Reliance on additional intermediaries can reduce agency problems between rule-makers and initial intermediaries, without replicating those problems between the rule-makers and the additional intermediaries. This analysis also reveals that, in some cases, intermediaries make rules, which blurs the distinction between rule-makers and intermediaries. Moreover, in complex governance networks, such as the food safety system, it is misleading to attribute the origin of many governance standards to authoritative “rule-makers.” Instead, standards emerge out of network interactions. The article concludes that by favoring the term “regulator” rather than “rule-maker,” the RIT model can avoid mischaracterizing rulemaking in complex regulatory systems without compromising its explanatory power with regard to reliance on intermediaries.

In recent years, a number of prominent scholars have touted the use of litigation as an effective tool for making public health policy. For example, Stephen Teret and Michael Jacobs have asserted that product liability claims against car makers have played a significant role in reducing automobile-related injuries, Peter Jacobson and Kenneth Warner have argued that litigation against cigarette manufacturers has advanced the cause of tobacco control, and Phil Cook and Jens Ludwig have suggested that lawsuits against the firearms industry can reduce gun violence. Critics have attacked this use of litigation as doing more harm than good to public health and as a misuse of the courts. This debate involves two distinct controversies: one over whether the public health benefits of litigation outweigh its costs and the other over the proper role of courts within our system of government.