The Taming of the Stew

Abstract

Based on a case study of food safety governance, this article examines how rule-makers can employ additional intermediaries to address agency problems between the rule-makers and the initial intermediaries upon whom they rely to govern targets of regulation. Reliance on additional intermediaries can reduce agency problems between rule-makers and initial intermediaries, without replicating those problems between the rule-makers and the additional intermediaries. This analysis also reveals that, in some cases, intermediaries make rules, which blurs the distinction between rule-makers and intermediaries. Moreover, in complex governance networks, such as the food safety system, it is misleading to attribute the origin of many governance standards to authoritative “rule-makers.” Instead, standards emerge out of network interactions. The article concludes that by favoring the term “regulator” rather than “rule-maker,” the RIT model can avoid mischaracterizing rulemaking in complex regulatory systems without compromising its explanatory power with regard to reliance on intermediaries.

Public and private food safety regulatory approaches: exploring the role of global food safety initiative auditors in achieving public health objectives, focusing on the Canadian experience

“…S. Parker, Wilson, LeJeune, & Doohan, 2012; S. Thompson et al, 2005;WHO, 2018). Finally, governing in the area of food safety has arrangements that often are considered networks (Busch, 2011a;Guthman, 2008;Lytton, 2017; L. J. Thompson & Lockie, 2013).…”

“…In response, governments made significant changes to their public food safety and consumer protection laws, placing greater responsibility on the retailer for the safety of the food and the management of their suppliers (Anders et al, 2010;Barling & Lang, 2003;Busch, 2010;Davey & Richards, 2013;Fagotto, 2014;Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2011;Hatanaka et al, 2005;Havinga et al, 2015;Henson, 2008;Hutter, 2011a;Hutter & Jones, 2007). Consumer illnesses from these food safety events were often addressed through tort law, and this in turn led insurance companies to support the development of private standards as a method of insuring due diligence and managing liability for food producer, retailer, and service organizations (Brewster & Goldsmith, 2007;Deaton, 2004;Drew & Clydesdale, 2015;Lytton, 2017;Marks, 2016;Rahim, 2011;Rouvière & Latouche, 2014;K. Webb & Morrison, 2004).…”

“…The audit process and auditor have been investigated from a regulatory perspective (Coglianese & Mendelson, 2009;García Martinez et al, 2007;García Martinez & Poole, 2004;Grabosky, 2013;Havinga, 2006;Oosterveer, 2015;Sodano et al, 2008;Swoffer, 2005; Bernd M.J. van der Meulen, 2011a; Verbruggen & Havinga, 2014b), a critical theory perspective (Anders et al, 2010;Burch & Lawrence, 2005;Busch, 2011a;Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Havinga, 2011;Konefal et al, 2005;Richards et al, 2011;Sodano et al, 2008;Tanner, 2000), and from a legal perspective (Brewster & Goldsmith, 2007;Fagotto, 2014;Hawkins & Hutter, 1993;Lytton, 2017;Marks, 2016;Rouvière & Latouche, 2014;Bernd M.J. van der Meulen, 2011a). This literature includes an extensive analysis of private food safety regulatory approaches, and some discussion of the GFSI-system specifically, but has limited discussion of an audit's objectives or the auditors' understanding of their role in the food safety and public health system (Davey & Richards, 2013;Short et al, 2014).…”

Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation

“…For instance, several papers in the AAAPSS special issue documented how, through their formal involvement in the downstream monitoring of regulation, RIs became experts. This expertise could then position them as informal advisors in upstream stages, when the regulation was being changed or revised (Galland 2017;Havinga & Verbruggen 2017;Lytton 2017;Silva 2017). Auld and Renckens (2017) provide a telling illustration.…”

Transitions towards sustainable food systems

“…Some firms might be motivated to participate in alliances because of stakeholder pressure, regulatory pressure, and economic opportunities (Bansal and Roth, 2000). Other private organizations, such as consultancies and auditing firms, may be motivated purely by compensation (Lytton, 2017). NGOs and civil society groups usually uphold strong values and promote them through their actions (De Silva, 2017).…”