Abstract. This article investigates the relationship between supplier concentration afld competition in the market for audit services. The study is motivated by the concern that high levels of concentration may be detrimental, resulting in lower levels of competition, which could harm clients through higher fees and lower levels of service. However, a counterargument is that high levels of concentration may not be detrimental but may result because market leaders display exceptional performaace, providing lower-priced audits (perhaps due to economies of scale) and/or enhanced service to clients. We obtained audit fee and financial data on 140 life and health insurance companies and 101 property and casualty insuraiace companies. Our findings indicate that concentration is negatively associated with fees, suggesting that higher levels of concentration are related to higher levels of price competition (i.e., lower fees). Additionally, we address the validity of conceatratioH as a surrogate for competition by examining competition among the market leaders. Our analysis examines the fees paid by 47 insurance companies that switched auditors during the sample period. We investigate the effect of industry specialization on fees paid by clients that switch auditors, finding evidence of significant fee cutting among market leaders for each others' clients but no evidence of fee reductions for clients switching from nonleaders to market leaders. This is coBsistent with the claim that there is significant price competition for clients among the market leaders, suggesting that high concentration need not result IB tow levels of price competition (i.e., higher fees).Resume. Les auteurs analysent la relation entre la concentration des fournisseurs et la coDcurrence sur le march^ des services de verification. L'etude d^coule de la preoccupation suivant laquelle des niveaux ^iev^s de concentration pourraient etre pr^judidables et donner lieu h une intensity plus faible de la concurrence qui risquerait de Mser les clients, en augmentant les honoraires et en diminuant la qaalit6 du service. L'argumentation oppos^e veut qu'un degri 61ev<5 de concentration ne soil pas prdjudiciable et puisse etre attribuable au fait que les chefs de file du marcM affichent une performance exceptionnelle, offrant des services de veri-

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The following paper describes the promise and reality of creating fraud and forensic accounting courses and curriculum. The project was supported by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Model Curriculum guidelines were developed in three main phases: (1) constituting a planning panel to guide the project and selecting the members of a technical working group of subject matter experts, (2) developing the curriculum guidelines, and (3) field-testing those guidelines. This paper provides background and motivation for the project, an overview of the project processes, and the educational guidelines (outcomes) that were developed by experts in the field.

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