In this paper we critically evaluate the role that the notion of voluntariness plays in the normative theory of migration. We argue that the notion is currently underdefined and works to undermine migrants' claims to see their migratory projects properly recognized. We argue that it is nevertheless important to be able to define when migration can be said to be voluntary if we are to theorize appropriate normative and policy responses to migrants' claims. We propose therefore a series of sufficient and necessary conditions to the definition of voluntary migration. We use the case of temporary migration to illustrate our argument.Kymlicka has not substantially altered his argument in his more recent work. See, for example, Kymlicka (2001:55). We would also like to note here that we do not necessarily disagree with Kymlicka's conclusions about the appropriateness of differential treatment of migrants and national minorities; we just take issue with the use of voluntariness to reach those conclusions.

and Tiziana TorresiPolitics, University of Oxford T EMPORARY migration has been a feature of migratory experiences throughout history. However, it has been relatively neglected in both the public imagination and academic discussions of migration. In the latter, temporary migration is usually associated with migration experiences forcibly limited in their duration-like the infamous case of guest worker programs-which raise normative questions mainly insofar as they represent unfair arrangements leading to difficult integration. But migrants have often chosen temporary migration as a worthwhile, albeit sometimes painful, part of their life-plans, undertaking what we call temporary migration projects. Moreover, as we argue in this article, the normative questions these life-plans raise are specific to this type of migratory experience, which liberal political philosophy has failed to tackle.In particular, we argue that temporary migration projects, entailing as they do a life effectively split between two polities, create a dislocation of social and political spaces, and consequently of the social bases of self-respect, making it possible and rational for a person to trade her status as an equal member of the receiving polity for a chance to advance her aims in the pursuit of happiness. By separating equal status and the pursuit of happiness in a way that is inconceivable according to the conventional understanding of citizenship and migrant integration, temporary migration gives rise to a dilemmatic choice between these two fundamental dimensions of liberal egalitarian justice.We address our arguments in this article to those liberal egalitarians who embrace what we call an "inclusivist" stance towards immigration. These theorists advocate (fairly) open borders and speedy integration for immigrants as a solution to what *The authors wish to thank, for insightful written comments, Cathryn Costello, Patti Lenard, Miriam Ronzoni, Christian Schemmel, Jonathan Seglow and Laura Valentini, as well as three anonymous referees. We were also helped and encouraged by discussions with

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This chapter considers the empirical data on the increase and impact of temporary and circular migration patterns across different regions of the world. It calls attention to two striking features of these migration patterns. First, very often temporary migration can be explained as the result of intentional plans made by the migrants themselves, who decide to work abroad for a limited period of time to collect resources to employ back home. Second, for those migrants who are employed in low-skill jobs these migratory patterns result in a position of marginality within the receiving societies, which often converts into severe forms of vulnerability and subordination. The chapter illustrates both the voluntary nature of these forms of temporary migration and their problematic implications by analysing in depth some paradigmatic examples.

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