In this paper we critically evaluate the role that the notion of voluntariness plays in the normative theory of migration. We argue that the notion is currently underdefined and works to undermine migrants' claims to see their migratory projects properly recognized. We argue that it is nevertheless important to be able to define when migration can be said to be voluntary if we are to theorize appropriate normative and policy responses to migrants' claims. We propose therefore a series of sufficient and necessary conditions to the definition of voluntary migration. We use the case of temporary migration to illustrate our argument.Kymlicka has not substantially altered his argument in his more recent work. See, for example, Kymlicka (2001:55). We would also like to note here that we do not necessarily disagree with Kymlicka's conclusions about the appropriateness of differential treatment of migrants and national minorities; we just take issue with the use of voluntariness to reach those conclusions.

and Tiziana TorresiPolitics, University of Oxford T EMPORARY migration has been a feature of migratory experiences throughout history. However, it has been relatively neglected in both the public imagination and academic discussions of migration. In the latter, temporary migration is usually associated with migration experiences forcibly limited in their duration-like the infamous case of guest worker programs-which raise normative questions mainly insofar as they represent unfair arrangements leading to difficult integration. But migrants have often chosen temporary migration as a worthwhile, albeit sometimes painful, part of their life-plans, undertaking what we call temporary migration projects. Moreover, as we argue in this article, the normative questions these life-plans raise are specific to this type of migratory experience, which liberal political philosophy has failed to tackle.In particular, we argue that temporary migration projects, entailing as they do a life effectively split between two polities, create a dislocation of social and political spaces, and consequently of the social bases of self-respect, making it possible and rational for a person to trade her status as an equal member of the receiving polity for a chance to advance her aims in the pursuit of happiness. By separating equal status and the pursuit of happiness in a way that is inconceivable according to the conventional understanding of citizenship and migrant integration, temporary migration gives rise to a dilemmatic choice between these two fundamental dimensions of liberal egalitarian justice.We address our arguments in this article to those liberal egalitarians who embrace what we call an "inclusivist" stance towards immigration. These theorists advocate (fairly) open borders and speedy integration for immigrants as a solution to what *The authors wish to thank, for insightful written comments, Cathryn Costello, Patti Lenard, Miriam Ronzoni, Christian Schemmel, Jonathan Seglow and Laura Valentini, as well as three anonymous referees. We were also helped and encouraged by discussions with

Public deliberation has been defended as a rational and noncoercive way to overcome paradoxical results from democratic voting, by promoting consensus on the available alternatives on the political agenda. Some critics have argued that full consensus is too demanding and inimical to pluralism and have pointed out that single-peakedness, a much less stringent condition, is sufficient to overcome voting paradoxes. According to these accounts, deliberation can induce single-peakedness through the creation of a 'metaagreement', that is, agreement on the dimension according to which the issues at stake are 'conceptualized'. We argue here that once all the conditions needed for deliberation to bring about single-peakedness through meta-agreement are unpacked and made explicit, meta-agreement turns out to be a highly demanding condition, and one that is very inhospitable to pluralism. Downloaded from democratic public can align its otherwise scattered and conflicting views about how to rank available policy options. Furthermore, it does this through a fully rational and noncoercive process. 1 This not only may appear as good in itself, but is also a sure remedy against the dangers of Arrovian cycles and the inconsistencies associated with democratic decision-making procedures, which have been brought to light and analyzed by social choice theory (Arrow, 1963;Riker, 1982). If there is consensus on how to rank and assess different available political options, then cycles do not occur and democracy is safeguarded against irrationality and manipulation.However, some critics have argued that aiming at consensus as a solution to these problems might not be the right strategy. Consensus, they have pointed out, is very difficult to achieve, even in the best deliberative circumstances. Moreover, aiming at consensus as a condition for the correct functioning of democracy shows disregard for pluralism, which is a defining feature of modern democratic societies and one that (at least within certain limits) deserves respect.In the past few years, a new and different account has emerged of how deliberation produces cycle-free democratic decisions. Specifically, what deliberation does, and should do, is not to bring about a substantive agreement on how to rank and assess the different options on the political agenda. Rather, it should encourage a meta-agreement concerning how those options should be 'conceptualized'. 2 The basic idea behind this claim is that substantive agreement (that is, identical orderings of the available alternatives by individual voters) is not only difficult to achieve, but also unnecessary for freeing democracy from cycles and paradoxical results. As shown by Duncan Black more than 50 years ago, a sufficient condition for avoiding such results is that citizens' preference orderings be 'single-peaked'; this means that although individuals' preferences may be different, they can be represented spatially along the same left-right dimension.Deliberation, it is argued, tends to bring about single-peakedness beca...

From within a “systemic approach” to deliberative democracy, political parties can be seen as crucial actors in facilitating deliberation, by playing epistemic, motivational, and justificatory functions that are central to the deliberative ideal. However, we point out that if we assume a purely outcome-oriented conception of the role of parties within a deliberative system, we risk losing sight of a central tenet of deliberative democracy and of its distinctive principle of legitimacy, namely, that citizens must be able to exercise critical reflection on the grounds of democratic decisions. We argue that parties have a special responsibility in making a deliberative system meet this requirement, and that such special role can be fulfilled only if parties’ programs, values, and strategies are shaped through intra-party deliberation. On the grounds of this discussion, we define a model of intra-party deliberation that is based on the principles of mutual acceptability, pluralism, and publicity.

Pettit’s claim that the discovery of the so-called ‘discursive paradox’ bears important implications for the normative theory of deliberative democracy has been challenged on the ground that there are substantial structural differences between the fora of democratic deliberation and the judicial context in which the paradox first emerged. In this article I defend Pettit’s claim against these objections, but I also reject the implications Pettit draws from his discussion of the paradox. Specifically, I argue against one of the key assumptions on which Pettit’s discussion rests: that in order to function properly as a guarantee against tyranny deliberation requires consistency. The upshot of the discussion is that the discursive paradox is, indeed, relevant for the theory of deliberative democracy. However, contrary to what Pettit’s argument suggests, the discursive paradox is not relevant because it reveals a conflict between deliberation and democracy. Rather, it is relevant because it reveals a conflict between deliberative democracy and the requirement of collective consistency