This paper provides su¢ cient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by …nite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Evolutionary stability, Finite populations JEL Codes: C72, C73 AbstractThis paper provides su¢ cient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by …nite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.

We study rent-seeking contests, where the set of players contains two groups of players – one with independent preferences and the other with (negatively) interdependent preferences. It turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two-player contests and in n-player-contests with non-increasing marginal efficiency. For general n-player contests with increasing marginal efficiency, the strategic advantage prevails provIDed convexity of contest technologies is sufficiently weak. For strongly convex contest technologies, other types of equilibria exist, including one where indivIDualists receive strictly higher pay-off. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006

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