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Abstract:We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperatio n are much higher in the U.S.A. than anywhere else.JEL classification: C72, C91, H41

Recent experimental research suggests that unpredicted behavior in the lab may result from endowment distribution and origin. We design an experiment to explore the impact of heterogeneous endowments and earned endowments on observed contributions in a linear public good game. Our results suggest that contribution levels were significantly lower when groups had heterogeneous rather than homogeneous endowments, with this finding being independent of the origin of endowment. We did not find, however, that the lack of free-riding in public goods experiments was an artifact of endowment origin. Group members contributed about the same to the public good whether their endowments were earned or not.

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