The Progress parties have been variously dubbed 'flash party, protest party', 'tax-revolt party', petty bourgeois protest movement populist party, 'extreme right-wing party' None of these labels passess unambrguously through a critical examination More recently, commentators have sometimes referred to the Progress parties as conventional bourgeois parties. Such a label is however. also problematic, as the social background or class profile of both parties shows an increasing dewaUun from conventional bourgeois parties Our approach is that the Progress parties must be interpreted in connection with the new cleavages in postindustral society We discuss the Progress parties in relation to cleavages emanating from the welfare state, and in particular to postindustrial materialism and the changed role of the working class

Studies of the electoral behaviour of immigrants in Western Europe and North America have revealed a remarkably coherent cross‐national voting pattern. Immigrants from the non‐Western world hold a strong preference for left‐of‐centre parties. This unusual expression of group voting is so stable over time that it has been referred to as an ‘iron law’. There is, however, a dearth of scholarly research on this phenomenon. This article tests two explanations for the left‐of‐centre preferences of immigrants in Norway. The first is that the ideological and socio‐economic composition of the immigrant electorate explains the preference for left‐of‐centre parties. If so, these voters' ethnic or immigrant background is not in itself decisive on Election Day. The second hypothesis is that immigrant voters engage in group voting, in which one's ethnic or immigrant background is significant and trumps other concerns when voting. This would express itself in a coherent voting pattern that cannot be explained by other factors. We also expect those who engage in group voting to favour candidates with similar ethnic backgrounds as themselves. The group voting hypothesis finds the strongest support. The immigrant vote appears to be driven by group adherence, rather than by ideology or social background.

The purpose of this article is to try to discern certain general features in the origins of the demands for referenda, and why these demands succeed or fail. A distinction is drawn between (a) the demand for a referendum on a certain issue and (b) the demand to amend the constitution to allow for referenda of one form or other. (a) Nation‐wide referenda are rare almost everywhere, but demands for referenda arise more frequently. The article argues there are often regularities in the way these demands arise. A request for a referendum on one specific issue can be regarded as a minority weapon. Those who have had their standpoint voted down demand a referendum. If their demand is to succeed, two conditions are important: parties which are split and strong commitment on the part of the voters. To understand why an original minority weapon can get support from the majority, two functions of the demand for referendum are central: the function as a mediation device and as a lightning rod. (b) Concerning interest in the introduction of the referendum as a more or less regular principle of government, we find that referendum enthusiasts often share a similar ideology or view of society. The most central catchword here is antiparty sentiment.

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