The Demand for Referendum: When Does It Arise and when Does It Succeed?*

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to try to discern certain general features in the origins of the demands for referenda, and why these demands succeed or fail. A distinction is drawn between (a) the demand for a referendum on a certain issue and (b) the demand to amend the constitution to allow for referenda of one form or other. (a) Nation‐wide referenda are rare almost everywhere, but demands for referenda arise more frequently. The article argues there are often regularities in the way these demands arise. A request for a referendum on one specific issue can be regarded as a minority weapon. Those who have had their standpoint voted down demand a referendum. If their demand is to succeed, two conditions are important: parties which are split and strong commitment on the part of the voters. To understand why an original minority weapon can get support from the majority, two functions of the demand for referendum are central: the function as a mediation device and as a lightning rod. (b) Concerning interest in the introduction of the referendum as a more or less regular principle of government, we find that referendum enthusiasts often share a similar ideology or view of society. The most central catchword here is antiparty sentiment.

Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU

“…More generally, Morel (2001) argues that parties only favour referenda if they are not divided on the matter because they are eager to avoid internal divides to become public, while Bjørklund (1982) conceives referenda as a means to overcome intraparty divides. According to Hug (2002, p. 32), governments may initiate a nonmandatory referendum for gaining popularity and closeness among their party supporters.…”

How to refuse a vote on the EU? The case against the referendum in the House of Commons (1974–2010)

“…The literature on direct participation identifies several reasons why governments and political parties commit to holding referendums on EU matters when referendums are not constitutionally required (see Bjørklund 1982;Lijphart 1984;Butler and Ranney 1994;Bogdanor 1994;Closa 2007;Morel 1993Morel , 2001Morel , 2007Schneider and Cederman 1996;Hug 2002Hug , 2004Qvortrup 2002Qvortrup , 2006Tridimas 2007;King 2007;Finke and König 2009;Dür and Matteo 2011). Lijphart, for instance, argues that governments only submit issues to referendums if they are certain that they will win (1984: 204).…”

Referendums and Ethnic Conflict

“…Thus, the Norwegian coalition government decided to hold a referendum on European Economic Community (EEC) entry in 1972 in order to avoid a split (Bjørklund 1982). This model applies to other cases too.…”

“…Well aware that the policies of Prime Minister Erik Gustaf Boström had antagonized public opinion in Norway, the parties on the right-especially the Protectionist Party of the Majority-knew ''even at the time before mass opinion polls that the Norwegians would vote for independence.'' However, ''calling a referendum could delay matters'' and would provide the parties on the Swedish right the opportunity to score party-political points- (Bjørklund 2003). The strategy, as suggested by Thomas Wyller, was internal, and the Swedish right was focused on the opportunity to win votes in the upcoming Swedish elections rather than preventing Norwegian independence (Wyller 1992: 40).…”

“…(Bjørklund 1982); another example is Laurence Morel's taxonomy of referendums (Morel 2005). These models are presented and subsequently reformulated into a formal model.…”