Public sector efficiency, Political and budgetary institutions, Fiscal capacity, Democratic participation, H72, H75,

Monopsonistic wage-setting power requires that the supply of labor directed toward individual establishments is upward sloping. This study utilizes institutional features to identify the supply curve. The elasticity of labor supply is estimated using data for the Norwegian teacher labor market in a period where the only variation in the wage level was determined centrally and with information on whether there is excess demand or not at the school level. In fixed-effects models, the supply elasticity faced by individual schools is estimated to about 1.4 and is in the range 1.0-1.9 in different model specification. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

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This paper utilizes a Norwegian experiment with exogenous wage changes to study teacher's turnover decisions. Within a completely centralized wage setting system, teachers in schools with a high degree of teacher vacancies in the past got a wage premium of about 10 percent during the period 1993-94 to 2002-03. The empirical strategy exploits that several schools switched status during the empirical period. In a fixed effects framework, the wage premium reduces the probability to quit by 6-7 percentage points and increases recruitment by 4-7 percentage points.

This paper studies teacher mobility using matched employee-employer panel data from Norwegian primary and lower secondary schools. The Norwegian institutional set-up with completely centralized wage setting for teachers is ideal to analyze the effect of non-pecuniary job attributes on quit decisions. We find that teachers tend to leave schools with high share of minority students and high share of students with special needs. In addition, the composition of teachers and the school size affect the propensity to quit. These results are robust across different econometric specifications and sub-samples. JEL classification: I29; J44; J45; J63