This paper explores the politics of welfare retrenchment, but differs from much of the current literature in this area by focusing not on the decisions of politicians but those of private sector employers. In countries with a large private welfare sector, employers are major social policy players with a significant influence on the generosity of welfare provision, but the rationale behind their actions is not well understood. To explore these issues, a case study is used of the recent fundamental change in UK occupational pension provision, involving a rapid shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pensions. The paper shows by means of a micro-simulation of the relative performance of defined-benefit, defined-contribution and state pensions that this shift represents a significant retrenchment. It suggests, using historical material, interview data and insights from behavioural economics, that existing explanations for this change, while valuable, have important gaps because they are based on too narrow a conceptualization of business motives. In this regard, the paper highlights the importance of herd behaviour. . For an overview, see Grabher and Powell (). . In the summer of  we conducted  expert interviews with all the major members of the British pension policy network, including the Minister for Pensions, the social policy spokesperson for the Conservative Party, major trade unions, the insurance industry and the CBI. These interviews lasted one hour. Our main aim was to discuss policies that would make the British pension system more socially inclusive. . All five workers could be either men or women, even though the full-time career on average wages is more common for men. We chose a gender for the sake of style. . Citing Ostaszewski (), they describe this change as New Economy Theory. . Between  and  the number of UK VAT-registered companies with a turnover of more than £ million rose by  percentage points (statistics.gov.uk, own calculations). . An interlocking directorship involves one person sitting on the boards of two companies. These can be directional interlocks, where the person has strong connections with at least one of the companies, or non-directional, where the person is affiliated to a third institution.

This article investigates the politics of reforming mature, pay-as-you-go pensions in the context of austerity. In both Sweden and Germany the Social Democratic party leadership advocated reform in response to similar financial and demographic pressures, but the Swedish reform was more successful in correcting perceived program weaknesses and in defending social democratic values. To explain this difference in outcomes, we focus on policy legacies and the organizational and political capacities of labor movements. We argue that existing pension policies in Germany were more constraining than in Sweden, narrowing the range of politically feasible strategies. By contrast, in Sweden, existing pension policy provided opportunities for turning vices into virtues and financing the transition to a new system. In addition, the narrow interests of German unions and the absence of institutionalized cooperation with the Social Democratic Party hindered reform. By contrast, the Swedish Social Democrats' bargaining position in pension reform negotiations with non-socialist parties was formulated with blue collar union interests in mind. The encompassing interests of Swedish unions and their close links with the Social Democrats facilitated a reform compromise.

The SPE-Scale is an appropriate screening instrument for hazards regarding gainful employment. It also can be recommended for use in epidemiologic or rehabilitation surveys.

The social division of welfare literature emphasises the extent to which occupational-pension provision is distributed on the basis of class and gender. As most previous commentators have at least implicitly recognised, however, a significant proportion of less advantaged people are covered. This paper argues that the patterns of access and their distributional consequences must be considered more systematically, and that in this context, the diversity of employers' pension schemes are investigated. When this is done, it emerges that in the United Kingdom, the spread of occupational provision beyond the most privileged workers means that some vulnerable individuals avoid poverty in retirement. At the same time, however, the main determinant of which less advantaged people are covered and which not is chance. While class and gender are important predictors of who receives occupational pensions, access for the disadvantaged arises mainly as an accident of an employment decision made for reasons unrelated to savings or pensions criteria. This paper argues that the implication is that unsustainable justice-based arguments are currently used by policy makers to sanction the current distribution of UK pension incomes. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for the appropriateness of recent UK policy proposals and for international debates about pension reform.

Concerted support from business organisations for increased state welfare provision is unexpected in liberal capitalism, but in Britain this occurred prior to recent major reforms of pensions. Using Mares’ micro-theory of employer behaviour and studies of public/private mixes, this article shows that three umbrella organisations of employers and insurers supported higher state pensions because incremental state regulation of non-state provision over many decades and threats about even greater compulsion in the private sector had significantly reduced company control while increasing their costs. As a result, a higher state pension appeared more attractive to all business actors than further regulation of the private sphere. On this basis, we suggest that state regulation should be incorporated more firmly into theories of institutional development and interest formation in liberal regimes.