Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is a new approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities in which nuclear safeguards provisions and features are designed into the facility from the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical protection, and other barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities, while integrating with safety and other project considerations. Because the successful implementation of SBD is primarily a project management and coordination challenge, this report focuses on that aspect.To improve the implementation of nuclear safeguards worldwide, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) commissioned a U.S. DOE National Laboratory project team to study how SBD could be implemented. This is in support of the NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). The long term objective is to promote the global implementation of SBD so that new nuclear facilities will be designed with nuclear safeguards, safety, and physical protection features incorporated into the facility. This will make new nuclear facilities safer, more secure, and more easily safeguarded. In addressing these issues early in the design stage, it will also be more cost effective, by avoiding the costly retrofits to accommodate these requirements after the facility starts up.In 2008, the SBD project team developed a high-level framework for institutionalizing SBD. As a result, the establishment of SBD as a global standard was found to depend on three pillars: 1) Requirements Definition, including the definition of requirements and criteria for successful safeguards performance, 2) Design Processes, including project management and coordination, and 3) Design Toolkit, including the technology and methodology used in the design and assessment of performance against requirements. These in turn were seen as resting on the foundation of Institutionalization, including education, outreach, training, and standardization. Each of these areas is vital to successfully establish SBD as a global standard.The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses on the design and construction process -specifically, project management and coordination. This includes project planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling, communication and interaction between the domestic and international safeguards authorities, facility builders, owner/operators, and other stakeholders during the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It further specifies the stages in an ideal nuclear facility design and construction project and identifies: 1) When safeguards design activities take place, 2) When safeguards stakeholders should be involved, 3) The interaction between safeguards requirements, analysis, and decision making relevant to plant design, and 4) The documents for recording this process, analysis, and de...

The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization's purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations.Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations' approaches to physical protection.The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.v CONTENTS

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This paper provides an overview of the methodology approach developed by the Generation IV International Forum Expert Group on Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection for evaluation of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection robustness of Generation IV nuclear energy systems options. The methodology considers a set of alternative systems and evaluates their resistance or robustness to a collection of potential threats. For the challenges considered, the response of the system to these challenges is assessed and expressed in terms of outcomes. The challenges to the system are given by the threats posed by potential proliferant States and sub-national adversaries on the nuclear systems. The characteristics of the Generation IV systems, both technical and institutional, are used to evaluate their response to the threats and determine their resistance against the proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and theft threats. System response encompasses three main elements: 1. System Element Identification. The nuclear energy system is decomposed into smaller elements (subsystems) at a level amenable to further analysis. 2. Target Identification and Categorization. A systematic process is used to identify and select representative targets for different categories of pathways, within each system element, that actors (proliferant States or adversaries) might choose to use or attack. 3. Pathway Identification and Refinement. Pathways are defined as potential sequences of events and actions followed by the proliferant State or adversary to achieve its objectives (proliferation, theft or sabotage). For each target, individual pathway segments are developed through a systematic process, analyzed at a high level, and screened where possible. Segments are connected into full pathways and analyzed in detail. The outcomes of the system response are expressed in terms of PR&PP measures. Measures are high-level characteristics of a pathway that include information important to the evaluation methodology users and to the decisions of a proliferant State or adversary. They are first evaluated for segments and then aggregated for complete pathways. Results are aggregated as appropriate to permit pathway comparisons and system assessment. The paper highlights the current achievements in the development of the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology. The way forward is also briefly presented together with some conclusions.

As commonly practiced, the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear power plants only considers accident initiators such as natural hazards, equipment failures, and human error. Malevolent initiators are ignored in PRA, but are considered the domain of physical security, which uses vulnerability assessment based on an officially specified threat (design basis threat). This work explores the implications of augmenting and extending existing PRA models by considering new and modified scenarios resulting from malevolent initiators. Teaming the augmented PRA models with conventional vulnerability assessments can cost-effectively enhance security of a nuclear power plant. This methodology is useful for operating plants, as well as in the design of new plants. For the methodology, we have proposed an approach that builds on and extends the practice of PRA for nuclear power plants for security-related issues. Rather than only considering “random” failures, we demonstrated a framework that is able to represent and model malevolent initiating events and associated plant impacts.