This thesis examines Nietzsche's philosophy as a response to Kant. I show that Kant, as interpreted by Nietzsche, dissociates epistemology and metaphysics. According to Nietzsche, the consequence of this dissociation is the collapse of Kant's transcendental epistemology into a sceptical idealism, which disables the making of positive metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. I argue that Nietzsche overcomes the dissociation of epistemology and metaphysics by rejecting Kant's distinction between constitutive, empirical knowledge and regulative, metaphysical belief. Furthermore, I show that Nietzsche rejects, what he considers to be, Kant's formalistic constitutive epistemology in favour of a regulative and interest-directed account of knowledge. I argue that Nietzsche adopts an internal realist epistemology that stipulates that our epistemic claims must be justified from within our perspectival practices of justification but that such claims must be subject to a realist constraint. Moreover, I propose that Nietzsche is justified, from within these epistemic parameters, in putting forward metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. The thesis is structured in four chapters. Chapter one examines Nietzsche's appropriation of Kant. Chapter two takes up the issue of Nietzsche's perspectivism in the context of his concerns with the issues of justification and truth. The penultimate chapter examines the emergence ofNietzsche's internal realism in his early writings. Finally, chapter four examines Nietzsche's will to power thesis where I contend that the metaphysics of the will to power is both facilitated by and compatible with his perspectivism. IntroductionThis thesis is primarily concerned to address the question of Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics as a response to, what he considers to be, both the partial success and ultimate failure of Kant's philosophy. I will argue that both Kant and Nietzsche share the same philosophical project, which is the desire to reconcile "knowledge and metaphysics".l However, I will maintain that it is Nietzsche's view that Kant ultimately fails to execute this task and that Kant is responsible for positing an epistemic gap between self and world. It will be shown that Nietzsche considers that this epistemic gap results from Kant's distinction between theoretical constitutive knowledge and regulative practical belief. The thesis will set about demonstrating the manner in which Nietzsche resolves this Kantian difficulty by practicalizing Kant's epistemic programme and removing the constitutive account of knowledge that merely serves, in Nietzsche's view, to forge an opposition between self and world. This will provide the focus of my subsequent examination of both Nietzsche's perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power. In examining these 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will 10 Power, translated by Waiter Kaufinann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 458 (1888. [Hereafter cited as WP] That Nietzsche aims to reconcile knowledge and metaphysics can be seen fr...

This thesis examines Nietzsche's philosophy as a response to Kant. I show that Kant, as interpreted by Nietzsche, dissociates epistemology and metaphysics. According to Nietzsche, the consequence of this dissociation is the collapse of Kant's transcendental epistemology into a sceptical idealism, which disables the making of positive metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. I argue that Nietzsche overcomes the dissociation of epistemology and metaphysics by rejecting Kant's distinction between constitutive, empirical knowledge and regulative, metaphysical belief. Furthermore, I show that Nietzsche rejects, what he considers to be, Kant's formalistic constitutive epistemology in favour of a regulative and interest-directed account of knowledge. I argue that Nietzsche adopts an internal realist epistemology that stipulates that our epistemic claims must be justified from within our perspectival practices of justification but that such claims must be subject to a realist constraint. Moreover, I propose that Nietzsche is justified, from within these epistemic parameters, in putting forward metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. The thesis is structured in four chapters. Chapter one examines Nietzsche's appropriation of Kant. Chapter two takes up the issue of Nietzsche's perspectivism in the context of his concerns with the issues of justification and truth. The penultimate chapter examines the emergence ofNietzsche's internal realism in his early writings. Finally, chapter four examines Nietzsche's will to power thesis where I contend that the metaphysics of the will to power is both facilitated by and compatible with his perspectivism. IntroductionThis thesis is primarily concerned to address the question of Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics as a response to, what he considers to be, both the partial success and ultimate failure of Kant's philosophy. I will argue that both Kant and Nietzsche share the same philosophical project, which is the desire to reconcile "knowledge and metaphysics".l However, I will maintain that it is Nietzsche's view that Kant ultimately fails to execute this task and that Kant is responsible for positing an epistemic gap between self and world. It will be shown that Nietzsche considers that this epistemic gap results from Kant's distinction between theoretical constitutive knowledge and regulative practical belief. The thesis will set about demonstrating the manner in which Nietzsche resolves this Kantian difficulty by practicalizing Kant's epistemic programme and removing the constitutive account of knowledge that merely serves, in Nietzsche's view, to forge an opposition between self and world. This will provide the focus of my subsequent examination of both Nietzsche's perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power. In examining these 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will 10 Power, translated by Waiter Kaufinann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 458 (1888. [Hereafter cited as WP] That Nietzsche aims to reconcile knowledge and metaphysics can be seen fr...

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This article addresses the Kantian background to Nietzsche's metaphysics. Focusing on the issues of causality and force, I argue that Nietzsche's will to power thesis emerges in response to Kant's approach to the question of causality. I contend that Nietzsche sides with Kant, contrary to Schopenhauer, in his identification of force with efficient causality, indicating his approval of Kant's restriction of the objective applicability of the concept of causality to the phenomenal sphere. However, Nietzsche contends that Kant fails to fully execute his project due to his retention of the thing-in-itself as the realm in which the inner determinations of things reside. I argue that Nietzsche makes it his task to complete the Kantian project by reconciling force with its disinherited inner determinations at the level of phenomena rather than things-in-themselves.

The following article offers a critical appraisal of the central arguments of John Richardson’s Nietzsche’s Values. It contends that although the book provides a comprehensive and illuminating interpretation of Nietzsche’s naturalist approach to value, it overlooks the more essentialist dimensions of his account of power.