This study addresses two important global trends: protection of public goods, specifically the environment, and the emergence of multiethnic societies with influential minority groups. The study tests the effect of a government proenvironmental demarketing campaign on the deconsumption behavior of minority groups and the majority population. It suggests that minority consumers use consumption or deconsumption to manifest their social identity, beliefs, and goals as minorities in relation to the majority and that their motivation to respond positively to a government's demarketing campaign is shaped by their national attachment levels. The study was conducted in Jerusalem, Israel, and involved a large data set (N = 66,272) containing household-level data on actual behavior of consumers. The studied groups involved the majority of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews and three minority groups: Israeli Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Jewish Russian immigrants. The findings show that in a proenvironmental context, government demarketing is more effective on the majority group than on any of the three minority groups. In addition, minority groups with lower national attachment levels respond more negatively to the demarketing effort. However, higher education levels lead to a more positive response across the majority and minority groups. A central implication of the findings is related to the benefits derived from demarketing for different consumer groups (majorities versus minorities based on religion, ethnicity, and immigration status). The findings also provide a benchmark for demarketing efforts in an environmental context. Finally, they suggest that policy makers and marketers should consider using demarketing more to complement regulatory and economic tools.

[1] We exploit a unique data set to estimate the degree of economies of scale in water consumption, controlling for the standard demand factors. We found a linear Engel curve in water consumption: each additional household member consumes the same water quantity regardless of household size, except for a single-person household. Our evidence suggests that the increasing block tariffs (IBT) structure, which is indifferent to household size, has unintended consequences. Large households, which are also likely to be poor given the negative correlation between income and household size, are charged a higher price for water. The degree of economies of scale found here erodes the effectiveness of IBT price structure as a way to introduce an equity consideration. This implication is important in view of the global trend toward the use of IBT.Citation: Dahan, M., and U. Nisan (2007), Unintended consequences of increasing block tariffs pricing policy in urban water, Water Resour. Res., 43, W03402,

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of social benefits level on take-up rates. We find that households who are eligible for double benefits (twins) have much higher take-up rate -up to double -as compared to a control group of households. Our estimated effect of benefits level is much higher relative to the standard cross section estimates. This finding is less exposed to a selection bias that might plague much of the previous research on the link between benefits level and take-up. It provides strong empirical support for the level of benefits as a key factor in determining take-up rates. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: I38.