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Significant attention has been devoted to agency theory in the financial literature. Dating back to the seminal contribution of Jensen and Meckling (1976), financial economists have examined agency relationships mainly in the context of shareholders versus managers, and shareholders versus creditors. The purpose of this essay is to document the existence of additional agency problems created as a result of the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. An introduction to the bankruptcy environment and the main features of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (hereafter referred to as the Act) are followed by description of the agency problems arising out of the 1978 Act.

Corporate finance is under attack. Commentators mention that corporate managers have enriched themselves and shareholders, and in the process have failed to consider the interests of all stakeholders (Hennessy, 1989, Alkhafaji, 1989, Newton, 1989, Dunfee, 1989, Steidlmeier, 1989, Jones and Hunt, 1991). They cite the active corporate control market that produced hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and corporate restructuring activity, all presumably causing a reduction in social welfare. This view is now beginning to permeate itself into the financial education debate. For example, Hawley (1991) suggests that financial educators are abdicating their responsibility of helping prepare corporate managers to recognize and deal with business ethics‐social responsibility effectively. Hawley proposes that the shareholder wealth maximization model for corporate management rationalizes the commission of unethical or socially irresponsible actions. Because of this ongoing criticism being levied against the practice of corporate finance, financial educators are now moving to incorporate ethics in the finance curricula. Although this move may be welcomed, we suggest that financial educators proceed with caution.

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