In developed competition jurisdictions, excessive pricing is more a subject of academic and expert discussions than an actively used instrument of competition enforcement. Russian competition enforcement is an exception in this regard. During the last ten years the Russian competition authority, the Federal Antirust Service (FAS), made several hundred decisions on the violation of rules prohibiting excessive pricing. Th e question remains whether Russian enforcement is consistent with international experiences, and which part of enforcement limits a positive welfare effect. To achieve this objective the article explains the targets of excessive price enforcement, the legal standard for excessive pricing, and remedies applied in Russian competition law. Th e main conclusion is that the selection of targets does not generally contradict the objectives of competition enforcement. Th ere are clear theories of harm specifi c to two of the main target groups: dominant exporting companies that apply third-price discrimination in the domestic market vis-à-vis export markets, and dominant companies that increase prices aft er deregulation, in case there is no new entry. Standards for proving price excessiveness represent a questionable part of enforcement, and they oft en turn out to be weak under judicial review. Th e application of either lower or higher standards for establishing price excessiveness results in decreasing the deterrence eff ect. A fear of decreasing deterrence explains the recent shift from ex-post intervention to ex-ante price remedies.

There is little evidence on the comparative effectiveness of different competition policy measures, especially in transition economies. This research represents the effort to expand the financial event study method for the assessment of different competition policy measures: merger control, antitrust investigations on abuse of dominance, and changes of import tariffs in the Russian ferrous and non-ferrous metals markets from 2007 to 2012. According to the reaction of financial market, mergers between Russian metal producers restrict competition and reduce consumer welfare. Antitrust investigations have a positive effect on stock prices of buyers of metal and no significant impact on the market valuation of target of investigation. Changes in import tariffs have a positive significant impact on the company stock prices. The sign of each effect allows the comparison of different measures of competition policy.

Russian producers are large participants in both domestic and international markets of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Their market power is limited on the world market due to the presence of competitors, while in Russia most of them have achieved an "almost monopolistic" position strengthened by a high market share as a result protection from import tariffs. During 1999-2011 numerous mergers in these industries were completed and approved by the Federal Antitrust Service -Russia's competition agency. The key problem of merger analysis in Russia's ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries is the trade-off between a (possible) weakening of competition in domestic markets and achieving competitive advantages in international markets. Most merger deals were approved only together with precisely developed merger remedies aimed at preventing dominance abuse. However, it is still unknown whether the weakening of competition and the abuse of dominance on the domestic market as the result of a merger indeed lead to harmful consequences. Using the financial event study method developed by Eckbo and Wier (1985), this paper empirically verifies the significance of anticompetitive effects of mergers in the domestic ferrous and non-ferrous metal markets. I find that, according to the financial market, mergers between Russian metal producers restrict competition and reduce consumer gains.