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Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of complaints and investigations decreases both the resources available per investigation and the standards of proof. It also distorts the structure of enforcement, increases the probability of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, and lowers deterrence. Statistics of antitrust enforcement in the Russian Federation, including Russian regions, highlight the importance of complaints for making decisions on whether to open investigations and the positive dependence of convictions on the number of investigations.

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In developed competition jurisdictions, excessive pricing is more a subject of academic and expert discussions than an actively used instrument of competition enforcement. Russian competition enforcement is an exception in this regard. During the last ten years the Russian competition authority, the Federal Antirust Service (FAS), made several hundred decisions on the violation of rules prohibiting excessive pricing. Th e question remains whether Russian enforcement is consistent with international experiences, and which part of enforcement limits a positive welfare effect. To achieve this objective the article explains the targets of excessive price enforcement, the legal standard for excessive pricing, and remedies applied in Russian competition law. Th e main conclusion is that the selection of targets does not generally contradict the objectives of competition enforcement. Th ere are clear theories of harm specifi c to two of the main target groups: dominant exporting companies that apply third-price discrimination in the domestic market vis-à-vis export markets, and dominant companies that increase prices aft er deregulation, in case there is no new entry. Standards for proving price excessiveness represent a questionable part of enforcement, and they oft en turn out to be weak under judicial review. Th e application of either lower or higher standards for establishing price excessiveness results in decreasing the deterrence eff ect. A fear of decreasing deterrence explains the recent shift from ex-post intervention to ex-ante price remedies.