Law and Economics of Antitrust Enforcement in Russia

Abstract

Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of complaints and investigations decreases both the resources available per investigation and the standards of proof. It also distorts the structure of enforcement, increases the probability of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, and lowers deterrence. Statistics of antitrust enforcement in the Russian Federation, including Russian regions, highlight the importance of complaints for making decisions on whether to open investigations and the positive dependence of convictions on the number of investigations.

The Effects of Competition Policy: Merger Approval, Entry Barrier Removal, Antitrust Enforcement Compared

“…Antitrust investigation and enforcement became important for market participants after the reform of fine system, which introduced fines up to 4% company turnover for antitrust law violations. However the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in Russia remains limited due to the high number of investigations and the high ratio of decisions reversed by courts, which indirectly display the high probability of Type I error (wrongful conviction) [Avdasheva, Kryuchkova, 2013]. Antitrust investigations provide a negative effect on future cash inflows of companies under investigations for several reasons.…”