Building on contract theory, we argue that financial covenants control the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers via two different mechanisms. Capital covenants control agency problems by aligning debt holder–shareholder interests. Performance covenants serve as trip wires that limit agency problems via the transfer of control to lenders in states where the value of their claim is at risk. Companies trade off these mechanisms. Capital covenants impose costly restrictions on the capital structure, while performance covenants require contractible accounting information to be available. Consistent with these arguments, we find that the use of performance covenants relative to capital covenants is positively associated with (1) the financial constraints of the borrower, (2) the extent to which accounting information portrays credit risk, (3) the likelihood of contract renegotiation, and (4) the presence of contractual restrictions on managerial actions. Our findings suggest that accounting‐based covenants can improve contracting efficiency in two different ways.

Using a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings. Covenants govern the transfer of decision‐making and control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a company approaches financial distress and thereby limit managers’ abilities to expropriate bondholder wealth. Covenants are expected to constrain managerial opportunism, however, only if the accounting system recognizes economic losses in earnings in a timely fashion. Thus, the demand for timely loss recognition should increase with a contract's reliance on covenants. Consistent with this conjecture, I find evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss recognition. I also find evidence that the presence of prior private debt mitigates this relationship.

Gross profit scaled by book value of total assets predicts the cross section of average returns. Novy-Marx (2013) concludes that it outperforms other measures of profitability such as bottom line net income, cash flows, and dividends. One potential explanation for the measure's predictive ability is that its numerator (gross profit) is a cleaner measure of economic profitability.An alternative explanation lies in the measure's deflator. We find that net income equals gross profit in predictive power when they have consistent deflators. Deflating profit by the book value of total assets results in a variable that is the product of profitability and the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of total assets, which is priced. We then construct an alternative measure of profitability, operating profitability, which better matches current expenses with current revenue. This measure exhibits a far stronger link with expected returns than either net income or gross profit. It predicts returns as far as ten years ahead, seemingly inconsistent with irrational pricing explanations.JEL classification: G11, G12, M41.

The concept of conditional conservatism has provided new insight into financial reporting and has stimulated considerable research since Basu (1997) developed it. While the concept encapsulated in the adage "anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses" is reasonably clear, estimating it is the subject of some discussion, notably by Dietrich et al. (2007), Givoly et al. (2007), and Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev (2011). Recently, Patatoukas and Thomas (2011) report important evidence of possible bias in firm-level cross-sectional estimates of conditional conservatism (asymmetric earnings timeliness) which they attribute to scale effects. They advise researchers to avoid using conditional conservatism estimates or making inferences from prior research using them, a view we regard as excessively alarmist. Our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest the explanation is a correlated omitted variables problem that can be addressed in a straightforward fashion, for example by fixed-effects regression. We show that crosssectional correlation between the expected components of earnings and returns confounds the relation between the news components, and biases estimates of how earnings incorporates the news in returns (e.g., timeliness). We also show that the correlation between the expected components of earnings and returns depends on the sign of returns, biasing estimates of asymmetric timeliness. When firm-specific effects in earnings are taken into account, estimates of asymmetric timeliness do not exhibit the bias, are statistically and economically significant (though smaller in magnitude and perhaps more consistent with priors), and behave as a predictable function of market-to-book, size and leverage. It would be surprising if this was not the case. Conditional conservatism accords with the long-standing accounting principle of anticipating losses but not gains, with specific asymmetric accounting rules such as the lower-ofcost-or-market method for inventories and the rules for impairment of long term assets, and with loss recognition practices that occurred prior to the promulgation of formal rules.

A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks ("news"), and how it depends on various market, political and institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise-linear regression of accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure. We analyze the measure's validity, in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different types of information with different lags, and with noise. We demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments, such as the length of the firm's operating and investment cycles, and its degree of diversification. We particularly examine one characteristic, the extent to which "unbooked" information (such as revised expectations about rents and growth options) is independent of other information, and discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market-to-book ratio. We also conclude that much criticism of the Basu regression misconstrues researchers' objectives.