This paper contributes to the discussion on international diversification and corporate social responsibility (CSR) by suggesting that firms can be simultaneously socially responsible and socially irresponsible. To test our assertions, we analyze data from 222 publicly traded US firms from 1993 to 2003. The findings support our hypotheses, and have significant implications for the way in which we conceptualize CSR. Journal of International Business Studies (2006) 37, 850–862. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400226

This paper challenges the predominant view that as CEOs near retirement, they forgo risky long-term strategic choices and instead focus on decisions that enhance their own short-term self-interests. Drawing on the socioemotional wealth (SEW) literature, we argue that unlike near-retirement CEOs in widely held firms, near-retirement CEOs in family firms are more concerned about transgenerational control and the legacy that they pass on to future generations. We further contend that the priority of SEW dimensions can change within family firms depending on the CEO's time to retirement. Consequently, nearretirement CEOs in family firms differ from their counterparts in non-family firms in that they are willing to continue to engage in international acquisitions as they approach retirement, despite the potential short-term risks. We further hypothesize that this effect depends on whether the CEO is a family member, whether the CEO is succeeded by another family member, and whether the CEO is the founder. In analysing 3432 family and nonfamily firm-year observations from the S&P 500 for the period between 1997 and 2009, we find support for our hypotheses. Subsequent analyses indicate that near retirement, family CEOs acquire larger and culturally closer targets than their non-family counterparts. Our paper confirms the need to more fully consider the characteristics of owners and managers in analyses of the CEO career horizon problem.

No abstract

Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Our study seeks to explain the relationship between publicly listed family-controlled firms (FCFs) and investor and employee outcomes before and during the global financial crisis. Theoretically, we develop hypotheses suggesting that FCF resilience is beneficial to both investor and employees. Employing a large firm-level data set of 2,949 firms across 27 European countries, we test the hypotheses that FCFs' long-term orientation makes them resilient to the effects of economic shocks. In addition, using hierarchical linear modeling we evaluate family firm investor and employee outcomes, and the moderating impact of legal institutions protecting minority investors and employees. Research Findings/Insights: We find that FCFs financially outperform non-FCFs during the financial crisis, beginning in 2007 and reaching its lowest point in 2009, but show no significant differences during the stable-growth period between 2004 and 2006. We evaluate two employee outcomes: downsizing and wage decreases. We find that FCFs are less likely to downsize their workforce or cut wages in both pre-crisis and crisis conditions. Based upon hypotheses founded in the comparative capitalisms logic, we find significant institutional effects that are contrary to our predictions. Our findings suggest that investors and employees of FCFs achieve more favorable outcomes for their interests when the rules pertaining to investor protection and their enforcement are poorly developed. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the emerging literature on the institution-based view of comparative corporate governance by demonstrating that family-controlled firms' stakeholder outcomes are contingent upon legal protection for employees and investors under contrasting economic circumstances. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Family owners, employees and minority investors should consider both firm-level and country-level governance institutions when investing in different countries, especially in times of economic crisis as jurisdiction-level institutions and firm ownership choices produce variable outcomes for different stakeholders in both crisis and non-crisis conditions.

The literature on advising family firms has primarily focused on providing practical advice through offering explicit intervention phases and advising models to family firm advisors. Yet the underlying implicit processes behind advising are not well understood. This study examines nine most trusted advisors in six family firms to develop a grounded theory model of how advisors capture attention, how they become attuned to family firm members to influence attention, and how they aid family members to collaboratively interrelate and mindfully govern the firm in order to facilitate an environment of collective attention.