G. E. Moore's critical analysis of right action in utilitarian ethics and his consequentialist concept of right action is a starting point for a theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences. The terms right and wrong have different meanings in these theories. The author explores different aspects of right and wrong actions in ethics of social consequences and compares them with Moore's ideas. He positively evaluates Moore's contributions to the development his theory of moral/right action.

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Martin Rázus (1888Rázus ( -1937 was one of the most important personalities of Slovak Lutheran social, political, cultural, literary, and intellectual life during the first half of the twentieth century. First, I examine the picture of Slovak rural morality portrayed in the works of Rázus, particularly his 1929 novel Svety [Worlds], in which Rázus presents the morality of the people in the Slovak countryside from the beginning of the twentieth century until the end of the 1920s. Second, as the ethical and moral issues of life are crucial topics of Rázus's philosophical and ethical reasoning, I examine Rázus's ethical treatise Argumenty [Arguments] (1932), in which he develops, explains, and philosophically justifies many of his ideas concerning the ethics and morality expressed in his literary works and political and religious essays.

This article analyses and assesses the arguments opposing capital punishment put forward by Ján Kollár (1793–1852), a representative of Central European Evangelical/Lutheran Enlightenment rationalism, using the definition of criminal practice in Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century as the basis. Consequently, the author pays attention to the movement for reform in criminal law and practices, initiated in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century by Cesare Beccaria, including his argumentation against capital punishment. In this context, the author presents and investigates 13 arguments against capital punishment defined by Kollár in his 1815 diary. The author came to the conclusion that Kollár, in his arguments against capital punishment, followed, to a certain extent, the views of Beccaria and eighteenth -century adherents of the French Enlightenment; however, Kollár’s actual argumentation is rationalistically based on ethical values of humanity and justice with significant space also dedicated to utilitarian aspects of rejecting capital punishment adopted from reformists of criminal law.