In partially observed Petri nets, diagnosis

Federated cloud systems increase the reliability and reduce the cost of computational support to an organization. However, the resulting combination of secure private clouds and less secure public clouds impacts on the overall security of the system as applications need to be located within different clouds. In this paper, the entities of a federated cloud system as well as the clouds are assigned security levels of a given security lattice. Then a dynamic flow sensitive security model for a federated cloud system is introduced within which the Bell-LaPadula rules and cloud security rule can be captured. The rest of the paper demonstrates how Petri nets and the associated verification techniques could be used to analyze the security of information flow in federated cloud systems.

In partially observed Petri nets, diagnosis is the task of detecting whether or not the given sequence of observed labels indicates that some unobservable fault has occurred. Diagnosability is an associated property of the Petri net, stating that in any possible execution an occurrence of a fault can eventually be diagnosed.In this paper we consider diagnosability under the weak fairness (WF) assumption, which intuitively states that no transition from a given set can stay enabled forever -it must eventually either fire or be disabled. We show that a previous approach to WF-diagnosability in the literature has a major flaw, and present a corrected notion. Moreover, we present an efficient method for verifying WF-diagnosability based on a reduction to LTL-X model checking. An important advantage of this method is that the LTL-X formula is fixed -in particular, the WF assumption does not have to be expressed as a part of it (which would make the formula length proportional to the size of the specification), but rather the ability of existing model checkers to handle weak fairness directly is exploited.

Privacy and information security have consistently been a priority for the European Union lawmaker. This paper investigates the security requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Directive on security of network and information systems (NISD). This investigation incorporates what is unique about the NISD; how it overlaps with existing frameworks; and how security requirements in the GDPR influence the NISD. This mapping of requirements can help businesses and organizations to distinguish possible difficulties that may experience while conforming to GDPR and NISD, and help them create a consistent cybersecurity framework and structure new security plans.

Abstract. Reference passing systems, like mobile and reconfigurable systems are common nowadays. The common feature of such systems is the possibility to form dynamic logical connections between the individual modules. However, such systems are very difficult to verify, as their logical structure is dynamic. Traditionally, decidable fragments of π-calculus, e.g. the well-known Finite Control Processes (FCP), are used for formal modelling of reference passing systems. Unfortunately, FCPs allow only 'global' concurrency between processes, and thus cannot naturally express scenarios involving 'local' concurrency inside a process, such as multicast. In this paper we propose Extended Finite Control Processes (EFCP), which are more convenient for practical modelling. Moreover, an almost linear translation of EFCPs to FCPs is developed, which enables efficient model checking of EFCPs.