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Except for some saintly altruists, the world revolves around 'Me'. We keep a mental network map showing who are our friends and our enemies. Who are the people I will see today or contact by the internet or mobile phone? Who can I count on for different kinds of help? Which of my friends and relatives know each other, and which get along with each other? So networks built around 'Me'-personal communities-have always been with us. But, nowadays, with Facebook and its ilk, people are becoming very aware that communities can consist of a person's network of relationships, wherever they are located.

This is an electronic version of an Article published in [7, p. 72] and for which he gave no rigorous proof -says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely and the relative quota is pegged, then -under certain conditions -the ratio between the voting powers of any two voters converges to the ratio between their weights. Lindner and Machover [4] prove some special cases of Penrose's Limit Theorem. They give a simple counter-example showing that the theorem does not hold in general even under the conditions assumed by Penrose; but they conjecture, in effect, that under rather general conditions it holds 'almost always' -that is with probability 1 -for large classes of weighted voting games, for various values of the quota, and with respect to several measures of voting power. We use simulation to test this conjecture. It is corroborated with respect to the Penrose-Banzhaf index for a quota of 50% but not for other values; with respect to the Shapley-Shubik index the conjecture is corroborated for all values of the quota (short of 100%).

Previous studies conducted for developed countries like the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have often found charitable giving by individuals to depend on income, the tax price of giving, and other variables. This article makes use of confidential tax file data to conduct a similar study for Singapore, a rapid‐growing newly‐industrializing country. The results indicate that disposable income, the tax price of giving, donor’s age and educational attainment are important determinants of charitable giving by individuals. Donations are found to be income‐inelastic but highly price‐elastic. Thus, lowering the price of giving through tax incentives can be very effective in encouraging private donations to charity.

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