In this paper we study partial differential equations (PDEs) that can be used to model value adjustments. Different value adjustments denoted generally as xVA are nowadays added to the risk-free financial derivative values and the PDE approach allows their easy incorporation. The aim of this paper is to show how to solve the PDE analytically in the Black-Scholes setting to get new semi-closed formulas that we compare to the widely used Monte-Carlo simulations and to the numerical solutions of the PDE. Particular example of collateral taken as the values from the past will be of interest.
Cooperative behaviour is often accompanied by the incentives to defect, i.e., to reap the benefits of others' efforts without own contribution. We provide evidence that cooperation and defection can coexist under very broad conditions in the framework of evolutionary games on graphs under deterministic imitation dynamics. Namely, we show that for all graphs there exist coexistence equilibria for certain game-theoretical parameters. Similarly, for all relevant game-theoretical parameters there exists a graph yielding coexistence equilibria. Our proofs are constructive and robust with respect to various utility functions which can be considered. Finally, we briefly discuss bounds for the number of coexistence equilibria.
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