Republičke i lokalne izbore u Srbiji 2022. godine posmatrao je veći broj međunarodnih i domaćih posmatrača. U ovom radu posmatranje se predstavlja kao način da se oceni i unapredi kvalitet izbora, i iznose se glavni nalazi posmatranja izbora koje je sprovela organizacija Crta. Detaljno se iznosi metodologija posmatranja izbornog dana na reprezentativnom uzorku biračkih mesta, sa naglaskom na formiranju uzorka, konstrukciji upitnika i obuci posmatrača, i objašnjava se logika zaključivanja na osnovu sakupljenih podataka. Posmatranje izbornog dana potvrdilo je da zvanični rezultati izbora odražavaju rezultate sa biračkih mesta na reprezentativnom uzorku, i da, i kada se uzmu u obzir evidentirane nepravilnosti, održavaju izbornu volju glasača. Dodatno su analizirane reakcije učesnika na izborima, predstavnika kandidata, međunarodnih i domaćih posmatrača, koji nisu suštinski osporavali rezultate izbora. Koristeći rezultate dva anketna istraživanja Crte sprovedena pre i posle izbora dana, analiziraju se i stavovi građana prema izborima. U radu se takođe problematizuje svrha građanskog posmatranja izbornog dana, u širem kontekstu u kom ređe dolazi do direktne manipulacije rezultatima izbora, ali je sve izraženiji problem dugoročna neravnopravnost učesnika. Izborno posmatranje ostaje važno i u takvim okolnostima, kao način da se unaprede izbori u celini, i da se poveća poverenje u demokratiju.

Why do some opposition parties in hybrid regimes escalate their strategies of contention from parliamentary to election boycotts, while others do not? Opposition parties in hybrid regimes engage with a repertoire of extra-institutional strategies, including protests, parliamentary, and election boycotts. These strategies challenge the authoritarian dimension of the regime and aim to level the electoral playing field, but the election boycotts strategy carries more risk than the others, as it can marginalize the opposition. I argue that the opposition parties in hybrid regimes are less likely to take part in elections when the expected incumbent’s electoral advantage is high, and when lower-risk extra-institutional strategies such as protests, and parliamentary boycotts are exhausted or not viable. The article presents evidence from Serbia, including data collected through interviews with the members of parliament and opinion polls, tracing the process that led the opposition parties to escalate the 2019 parliamentary boycott towards the 2020 boycott of the elections, despite being aware of the likely adverse effects. I also conduct a comparative analysis of opposition parties in similar contexts of North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania that boycotted the parliament but always took part in the elections. The article brings together the detached literature on parliamentary and electoral boycotts and contributes to a better understanding of opposition strategies in hybrid regimes.

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Participation in deliberation in stable democracies produces effects which are beneficial for democracy, while the results of deliberative innovations in non-democracies are more ambiguous. This article contributes to the debate about the effects of participatory democratic innovations on attitudes, related to democratic commitments, political capacities and political participation, in the increasingly ubiquitous hybrid regimes. We present the evidence collected from the participants before and after deliberative mini publics (DMPs), held in Serbia in 2020. Serbia is an exemplary case of a recent wave of autocratization, which had led to it becoming a hybrid regime, and it had no track record of deliberative innovations. When conducting the mini publics, we introduced an innovation in the standard design, by including active citizens - representatives of local initiatives or social movements particularly interested in the issue of DMPs. We could not find evidence that the democratic innovation affected attitudes of participants regarding democratic commitments, political capacities and political participation. However, we did find that participants of the DMPs became less satisfied with the functioning of the democracy on the local level. We argue that the anti-democratic wider context of hybrid regimes can produce adverse effects when introducing participatory democratic innovations, at least when it comes to this specific dimension of political participation. We conclude with the suggestions for further research, and a call for consideration of the wider political context when designing democratic interventions in hybrid regimes.