No abstract

The genetically-modified-organism (GMO) experience has been prominent in motivating science, industry, and regulatory communities to address the social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnology. However, there are some significant problems with the GMO-nanotech analogy. First, it overstates the likelihood of a GMO-like backlash against nanotechnology. Second, it invites misconceptions about the reasons for public engagement and social and ethical issues research as well as their appropriate roles in nanotech research, development, application, commercialization, and regulatory processes. After an explication of the standard GMO-Nanotech analogy, these two problems are discussed in turn.

The purpose of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) is to promote nanotechnology in a way that benefits the citizens of the United States. It involves a commitment to support responsible development of nanotechnology. The NNI's enactment of this commitment is critically assessed. It is concluded that there are not adequate avenues within the NNI by which social and ethical issues can be raised, considered, and, when appropriate, addressed.

A significant share of the U.S. federal R&D budget is devoted to large-scale, complex technological systems commonly referred to as "big science. " Over the last two decades, these systems have continued to grow in size, complexity, development time, and cost. At the same time, political changes in the United States, particularly the concern over government spending and the federal budget deficit, have made it more difficult for proponents to secure and preserve support for these programs over their (increasingly long) lifetimes. Using the U.S. space shuttle and space station programs as examples, the article shows that the political requirements for obtaining approval and funding for large and expensive research and development projects create conditions that reduce the likelihood that they will succeed technologically. The problems of technology-based projects like those of the U.S. space program are in fact deeply rooted in the American political process itself.The last several years have not been very kind to proponents of large-scale technologies, especially those developed, operated, or regulated by governments. Beginning with the nuclear power plant accident at Three Mile Island, there have been many reports of failures, breakdowns, and delays (not to mention outright catastrophes) in technology-based programs, including the U.S. space shuttle, the Stealth fighter-bomber, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the Freedom space station. The various congressional, presidential, and external bodies investigating these incidents more often than not attributed them to some combination of poor management, improper oversight, or failed communication within the relevant organizations. The general impression left by such findings is that the problems with these systems are largely administrative in nature, and that technical breakdown or human error would occur less frequently (or would be more readily detected) if the programs in question were simply run more efficiently.

No abstract