Naming individual objects is accompanied with semantic recognition. Previous studies examined brain-networks responsible for these operations individually. However, it remains unclear how these brain-networks are related. To address this problem, we examined the brain-networks during a novel object-naming task, requiring participants to name animals in photographs at a specific-level (e.g., "pigeon"). When the participants could not remember specific names, they answered basic names (e.g., "bird"). After fMRI scanning during the object-naming task, the participants rated familiarity of the animals based on their sense of knowing. Since participants tend to remember specific names for familiar objects compared with unfamiliar objects, a typical issue in an object-naming task is an internal covariance between the naming and familiarity levels. We removed this confounding factor by adjusting the familiarity/naming level of stimuli, and demonstrated distinct brain regions related to the two operations. Among them, the left inferior frontal gyrus triangularis (IFGtri) contained object-naming and semantic-recognition related areas in its anteriorventral and posterior-dorsal parts, respectively. Psychophysiological interaction analyses suggested that both parts show connectivity with the brain regions related to object-naming. By examining the connectivity under control tasks requiring nonlexical semantic retrieval (e.g., animal's body color), we found that both IFGtri parts altered their targeting brain areas according to the required memory attributes, while only the posterior-dorsal part connected the brain regions related to semantic recognition. Together, the semantic recognition may be processed by distinct brain network from those for voluntary semantic retrievals including object-naming although all these networks are mediated by the posterior-dorsal IFGtri. K E Y W O R D S declarative memory, familiarity, functional connectivity, inferior frontal gyrus, memory retrieval, naming, semantic control

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In this article, we identify some of the major obstacles that have hindered the development of a general theory of individual differences in evolutionary psychology. These obstacles include inattention to particular types of individual differences and failure to consider new findings in fields such as behavior genetics, neuroscience, cultural psychology, and psychopathology. We also identify key challenges to developing an evolutionary psychological theory of individual differences, including Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic-centric sampling and the variable impact of development and ecology on individual differences. We end with a discussion on how evolutionary psychology could meet the challenge of a general theory of individual differences by incorporating new methodologies, findings from other disciplines, and focusing on aspects of individual differences that have received little attention in the past. Public Significance StatementThis study discusses the concept of a 'general theory' for individual human differences, and what such a theory would require. We argue that evolutionary psychology has the potential to meet these requirements and discuss the thresholds that have hindered it from doing so in the past. Moving forward, we propose a number of ways in which evolutionary psychologists could overcome these hurdles in the near future.