Sunlight-driven water splitting to produce H 2 is an active field of energy research due to its promising potential to obtain renewable energy sources in a sustainable way. [1] One of the key requirements for achieving water photolysis with high "solar-tohydrogen" efficiencies is developing efficient photocatalysts. [2,3] Photoactive metal-organic frameworks (MOFs) represent one of the most promising materials for photocatalytic hydrogen production, but phosphonate-based MOFs have remained largely underdeveloped compared to other conventional MOFs. Herein, a photocatalyst of 1D titanium phosphonate MOF is designed through an easy and scalable stirring hydrothermal method. Homogeneous incorporation of organophosphonic linkers can narrow the bandgap, which is due to the strong electron-donating ability of the OH functional group that can efficiently shift the top of the valence band, moving the light absorption to the visible portion of the spectrum. In addition, the unique 1D nanowire topology enhances the photoinduced charge carrier transport and separation. Accordingly, the titanium phosphonate nanowires deliver remarkably enhanced photocatalytic hydrogen evolution activity under irradiation of both visible light and a full-spectrum simulator. Such concepts of engineering both nanostructures and electronic states herald a new paradigm for designing MOF-based photocatalysts.

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Unconditional security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol has been proved by exploiting the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, but the practical quantum key distribution system maybe hacked by considering the imperfect state preparation and measurement respectively. Until now, different attacking schemes have been proposed by utilizing imperfect devices, but the general security analysis model against all of the practical attacking schemes has not been proposed. Here, we demonstrate that the general practical attacking schemes can be divided into the Trojan horse attack, strong randomness attack and weak randomness attack respectively. We prove security of BB84 protocol under randomness attacking models, and these results can be applied to guarantee the security of the practical quantum key distribution system.