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We argue that conservative districts that go Democratic for the House should be likely to choose a Republican for president, while liberal districts represented by a Republican should be likely to opt for a Democrat for president. We test these and related predictions about split-ticket voting with election data from the eight presidential elections between 1964 and 1992. We show that ideological differences in the estimated location of the district's median voter explains a substantial component of the systematic variation in patterns of split outcomes in this period across districts, but that other factors (e.g., an especially popular incumbent or a particularly poor challenger, the magnitude of presidential election victory, region-specific realignment effects) also play a role.Why do voters split their tickets between a president of one party and a representative or senator of another party? Why do some districts register a majority of votes for one party's presidential candidate but simultaneously give their support to another party's candidate for House or Senate? Why has the degree of ticket-splitting and the number of constituencies with split outcomes generally been on the rise from the minuscule proportions they were in elections earlier in this century?The best-known line of argument seeking to answer these questions can be labeled the "candidate-centered politics" thesis. According to this thesis, declining voter party loyalties, the rise in the number of voters who call themselves independents, media-centered campaigns, the decline of party machines, and an