An integrated perspective on the three potential sources of partisan bias: Malapportionment, turnout differences, and the geographic distribution of party vote shares

Grofman, Bernard; Koetzle, William; Brunell, Thomas L.

doi:10.1016/s0261-3794(97)00037-1

Cited by 109 publications

(57 citation statements)

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“…A substantial literature ponders the unintended partisan consequences of a variety of phenomena with no overt partisan origin or objective. These include redistricting to boost minority representation (Brace, Grofman, and Handley 1987;Schotts 2001), differential rates of turnout across districts (Campbell 1996;Grofman, Koetzle, and Brunell 1997), and simple differences in residential patterns for supporters of each party (Chen and Rodden 2011). In all these examples, efficiency is believed to reflect a more fundamental partisan disparity.…”

Section: Efficiency Symmetry and Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Constituency size is a matter of efficiency because the party that wins districts with smaller numbers of voters claims more seats with fewer votes.) Many important studies since then have also used symmetry as a measure but described some form of efficiency as the concept of interest (e.g., Campagna and Grofman 1990;Cox and Katz 2002;Engstrom 2006;Erikson 1972;Gilligan and Matsusaka 1999;Grofman, Koetzle, and Brunell 1997;Kastellec, Gelman, and Chandler 2008).…”

Section: Efficiency Symmetry and Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, future research could use Equation instead of Equation to explore the subject. For more on turnout effects in SMD elections, see Campbell () and Grofman, Koetzle, and Brunell ().…”

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confidence: 99%

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Measuring Partisan Bias in Single‐Member District Electoral Systems

McGhee

2014

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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In recent decades, the literature has coalesced around either symmetry or responsiveness as measures of partisan bias in single‐member district systems. I argue neither accurately captures the traditional idea of an “efficient” gerrymander, where one party claims more seats without more votes. I suggest a better measure of efficiency and then use this new measure to reconsider a classic study of partisan gerrymandering. Contrary to the original study findings, I show that the effects of party control on bias are small and decay rapidly, suggesting that redistricting is at best a blunt tool for promoting partisan interests.

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Section: Efficiency Symmetry and Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Efficiency Symmetry and Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Measuring Partisan Bias in Single‐Member District Electoral Systems

McGhee

2014

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“…For example, the average disproportionality or volatility measured on the district level will not be the same as the total disproportionality or volatility observed in terms of national seat and vote shares (cf. Grofman et al, 1997). 15 A referee has suggested that volatility is different because a measure of volatility should be based on the total electorate rather than on the votes cast.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping the Indices of Seats–Votes Disproportionality and Inter-Election Volatility

2003

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A B S T R A C TMeasures of electoral system disproportionality and of party system volatility (as well as malapportionment and vote splitting) present similar statistical issues in terms of deciding what index is most appropriate, but it is not common to view indices of disproportionality and volatility as serving similar ends. Making use of 12 different criteria, we evaluate 19 indices that have been previously proposed as measures of either disproportionality of electoral seats-votes results or over-time volatility of party vote (or seat) shares. We suggest that, on balance, Gallagher's (1991) index, which has achieved increasing acceptance in the seats-votes literature on disproportionality (see esp. Lijphart, 1994) offers the most desirable combination of features, although the advantages it offers over the Loosemore-Hanby index are not large and are debatable. We also find that Dalton's principle of transfers presents an ambiguity when one party has a larger number of excess seats, while another has a larger proportion of them.KEY WORDS Ⅲ Dalton's principle of transfers Ⅲ malapportionment Ⅲ proportionality Ⅲ volatility of party shares Ⅲ vote splitting The Objective: Mapping the Measures of DiscordanceDeviation from proportional representation (PR) means the difference in party vote shares and party seat shares in some given election (v i versus s i ). Volatility of votes means the difference in party vote shares (v i ) from one election to another (v it versus v it' ); similarly, volatility of seats means the difference in party seat shares (s i ) from one election to another (s it versus s it' ). How do we best measure the proportionality/disproportionality of the translation of party vote shares into party seat shares in a given election?

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“…This is clearly an oversimplification: whereas a uniform swing did largely characterise British election results in the 1950s and 1960s, inter-election change is now much more variable across the constituencies. As an illustrative device Brookes' method has a number of advantages, however; not least the easily appreciated metric it employs (bias is measured as differences in the number of seats won) and its ability to decompose the bias into its various components using that metric, something that no other method does (Grofman, Koetzle and Brunell 1997). As such, it is a valuable heuristic device.…”

Section: Defining Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%