Using data collected by Jensen (1984), we investigate whether cooperative and inverse reciprocity can successfully predict U.S. and Soviet actions during the 23 rounds of strategic arms negotiation during the 1969-1979 period. Each type of reciprocity gives rise to three models of bargaining behavior, which we implement as computer routines. In our analysis, we find that the cooperative reciprocity models fit more often than inverse reciprocity models Beginning in 1969, the United States engaged in an almost continuous series of strategic arms control talks with the Soviet Union, climaxing with the signing of the SALT II Treaty in June 1979.The record of these negotiations gives us a valuable field laboratory for testing a variety of models of the negotiation process. This is an especially interesting series of interactions to study, because it involves the two most powerful nations in the world on issues of extreme importance.Thanks to the recent work of Jensen (1984), we have available a coding of all major concessions and retractions made by the two sides during these negotiations. These data will be used to test two sets of assumptions about the bargaining strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union during the strategic arms control talks. One set of assumptions is built around the notion of cooperative reciprocity, and the other set is built around the notion of inverse reciprocity (Bartos,1974). First, we outline both bargaining frameworks, and then we formalize each into a set of three different models. After reviewing Jensen's data-making procedures, we test all six models to determine whether the United States and the Soviet Union pursued and reacted to "soft-line" or "hard-line" bargaining strategies during their strategic arms negotiations. Bargaining: Frameworks and ModelsThe study of bargaining spans several disciplines and encompasses many conceptions of the negotiation process; we will deal with only two in this article. First, we consider the main features of these two frameworks and then we provide three different models for each framework. Each model is a specific representation of a framework that can be tested against Jensen's data. (1984: 535-536) captures the essence of the cooperative-reciprocity framework and its centrality to the bargaining literature as follows: Cooperative Reciprocity JensenPerhaps no proposition relating to bargaining behavior has been better documented in both experimental studies and real life situations than the one suggesting that concessions tend to be reciprocated.Often only implied but not stated is the other side of the reciprocity coin: Retractions tend to be reciprocated as well One well-known example of such a reciprocating strategy is "tit for tat"in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this game, each player has two strategies: cooperate or defect. Using a tit-fortat strategy, the player begins by choosing the cooperative strategy on the first round. In subsequent rounds, the player selects the strategy played by the opponent in the...

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