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Arendt afirma que nuestra natalidad (es decir, la condición de haber nacido) es la “fuente” o “raíz” de nuestra capacidad para comenzar (a saber, de nuestra capacidad para iniciar algo nuevo). Sin embargo, ella no explica esta afirmación a cabalidad. ¿Cómo es que la capacidad para comenzar deriva de la condición de nacimiento?  Debido a que Arendt no proporciona una respuesta inmediata y clara a esta pregunta, su noción de natalidad ha sido interpretada de maneras muy diferentes. Este trabajo busca aclarar la noción. Se reúnen y se examinan los comentarios dispersos de Arendt acerca de la natalidad y se propone una nueva interpretación que responde a dicha pregunta. En el proceso, se demuestra cómo surgieron las diversas interpretaciones existentes y se argumenta que son inadecuadas.

The distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary is part of our everyday thinking. We employ it in various forms, opposing the normal and the exceptional, the conventional and the groundbreaking, the old and the new, be it with respect to political events, or artworks, or scientific ideas.In recent European philosophy, this distinction has taken center stage. It has done so mainly under the term "event," which has become established as a term of art to designate an extraordinary occurrence, an occurrence that transcends or disrupts the normal course of affairs. The most prominent exponents of this development are Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Alain Badiou. In the thinking of these philosophers, we find, expressed in the notion of event and related notions, a common focus on the extraordinary, a common insistence on what goes against or beyond the status quo.Why has the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary gained such philosophical prominence? As a general statement, we can say that it has become the anchor and vehicle of certain philosophical hopes. The hopes involved are quite diverse-the hope of overcoming metaphysics (Heidegger), the hope of realizing freedom (Arendt), the hope of disrupting the economy of exchange (Derrida), the hope of reaching into the infinite (Badiou). But we can see a common denominator. The hopes are based on the attribution of a special role or power to the human being-the role of "founder and preserver of the truth of be-ing" 1 (Heidegger), the power of making a new beginning (Arendt), the role of creator of eternal truths (Badiou), the power of giving and forgiving without conditions (Derrida). In order to pin down the commonality, and to make explicit the connection with the ordinary/extraordinary distinction, I would like to subsume these views under the following description: In their various ways, Heidegger, Arendt, Derrida, and Badiou ascribe to the human being the power to do the extraordinary, the capacity to act against or beyond the prevailing rules and practices.The force that the ordinary/extraordinary distinction here exerts is twofold. On the one hand, it sets humans apart from other animals. Whereas the behavior of other animals is taken to be completely governed by natural instincts, humans are seen as capable of resisting and transcending the natural or social determinations they

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